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379 
EYING THE BODY: THE IMPACT OF 
CLASSICAL RULES FOR DEMEANOR 
CREDIBILITY, BIAS, AND THE NEED TO 





The Honorable Mark W. Bennett is only the most recent 
observer to lament that “[t]he standards for determining wit-
ness credibility have persisted as if frozen in time, based on 
myth, and completely unconnected with current knowledge of 
cognitive psychology.”2  Judge Bennett’s frustration is under-
standable.  The belief that most people can reliably detect lies 
by scrutinizing the body of the speaker is quite simply false, a 
fact recognized for at least twenty-five years—or 2,500.3  In-
creasing awareness of implicit or cognitive bias in decision-
making renders continued reliance on physical signs of credibil-
ity even more suspect.4  The question that remains is: Why has 
 
1.  Daphne O’Regan, Michigan State University College of Law.  I thank 
Professors Linda Edwards, Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Sammy Mansour, Larry 
Cata Baker, Peter Yu, and Marc Poirier, and students and former students 
Matthew Piccolo, Nicholas Schroeder, Thomas Skuzinski, and Michael Foster 
for their help. 
2.  Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Unspringing the Witness Memory and De-
meanor Trap: What Every Judge and Juror Needs to Know About Cognitive 
Psychology and Witness Credibility, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1331, 1371 (2015).  For 
demeanor in general, see id. at 1346-51.  The impact is widely discussed.  See, 
e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Centennial Address: Emotion, Reason, and the Pro-
gress of Law, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 921, 924 (2013). 
3.  Olin Guy Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088 
(1991) was the seminal work with about 195 citing references (last checked 
on WestlawNext, Jan. 16, 2017).  The legal academy no longer credits de-
meanor evidence, yet the courts, with a few exceptions, ignore this wide-
spread consensus.  See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, 
and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2563-64 (2008).  As shown infra Part 
I, the problem was recognized in Euripides’ Hippolytus, first produced in 428 
B.C.E. EURIPIDES, HIPPOLYTUS, in EURIPIDES I 160 (David Grene & Richmond 
Lattimore eds., David Grene trans., 1955). 
4.  For cognitive bias, see Carla L. MacLean & Itiel E. Dror, A Primer on 
1
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nothing changed?5  One neglected explanation is the continu-
ing, but unacknowledged, influence of classical rhetoric.6  The 
educational history and immense prestige of elite rhetoric has 
embedded its traditional forms and ideological claims deeply 
into legal education and practice.7  Highly specific, elite rules 
about bodily credibility are so entrenched that they seem ordi-
nary common sense,8 even as they are taught to first-year law 
students and as they govern behavior in courtrooms. 
But allegiance to the classical paradigm of bodily credibil-
ity is not just a matter of conservatism and the impact of histo-
 
the Psychology of Cognitive Bias, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: 
STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 13-21 
(Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016) [hereinafter 
BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS].  For recognition of the impact of implicit or 
cognitive bias in law, see infra note 312.  
5.  Other tools for determining credibility may well work, such as the 
content of what is said, cross-examination, context, and questioning strategy.  
Minzner, supra note 3, at 2563-64.  This article discusses only credibility de-
terminations based on conventional physical markers of truthfulness or de-
ception.  
6.  Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 1545, 1555 (1990). 
7.  Wetlaufer points out “discipline-specific rhetorics are cultural arti-
facts . . . [and] are the products of circumstances and purposes and that in a 
certain way they have a life of their own. Further, this structure suggests 
that we may be blind to certain choices we have made and to certain conse-
quences associated with those choices.”  Id. at 1587-88.  Similarly, 
“[e]xamining the presuppositions of evidence law may nevertheless be useful 
by helping to explain the resistance that has blocked most proposed innova-
tions. The causes of this resistance would otherwise be hard to understand.”  
John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1257 
(2006). 
8.  For the idea that credibility is to be assessed with common sense, 
which includes demeanor, see 1 CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO 
CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK § 3:2 (2015).  “As Judge Jerome 
Frank . . . observed, the methods of evaluating oral testimony ‘do not lend 
themselves to formulations in terms of rules and are thus, inescapably, ‘un-
ruly.”  John L. Kane, Judging Credibility, 33:3 LITIG. 31, 31 (Spring 2007), 
http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Judges/JLK/Judging_Credi
bility_LITMAG_Spring07_kane.pdf.  “Determining the weight and credibility 
of witness testimony . . . has long been held to be the ‘part of every case [that] 
belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intel-
ligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’”  United 
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998).  Thus, “the epistemology of evi-
dence law is also rooted in common everyday beliefs that have not been fully 
analyzed by courts or academics.”  Daniel D. Blinka, Why Modern Evidence 
Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 357, 361 (2010). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1
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ry.  Presuppositions driving classical demeanor permeate legal 
assignments of rationality and emotion, truth and lies.  These 
presuppositions, in tandem with the ancient theory of a univer-
sal language of non-verbal communication, may have little ba-
sis in fact, but they perform crucial structural work.9  They re-
duce the perceived institutional risk of error due to cultural, 
social, and individual differences in demeanor.  But even more 
importantly, they reconcile the professional claims of highly 
trained, persuasive advocates10 with the truth-seeking goal of 
adversarial trial.11  However, this same demeanor paradigm 
imposes tragic risks of error on participants in litigation.  A 
modest solution is changed instruction in law schools.  A more 
far-reaching solution, increasingly embraced to reduce biases, 
extends a suggestion made by Blumenthal and Pager: judges 
and juries should be screened so they cannot see any partici-
pants in a legal proceeding.12 
In what follows, I focus on law students and attorneys, not 
parties, witnesses, experts, and others.  Part I briefly provides 
background: the pivotal role of classical rhetoric in western ed-
ucation, including the United States, the dispositive position of 
demeanor credibility in oral trial, and the persistent doubts 
about its reliability—doubts turned into certainty over two 
decades of research.  Part II compares modern and ancient 
 
9.  Similarly, both Fisher and Leubsdorf find much about the rules of ev-
idence and the jury’s role to be explained by institutional necessity.  See 
Leubsdorf, supra note 7, at 1209; George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detec-
tor, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 624 (1997). 
10.  Similarly, refusal to allow expert testimony about eyewitnesses may 
also be “to affirm the professionalization of American trial procedure by law-
yers and judges.”  Note, The Province of the Jurist: Judicial Resistance to Ex-
pert Testimony on Eyewitnesses as Institutional Rivalry, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
2381, 2382-83 (2013). 
11.  See generally Hon. Mark I. Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert 
Testimony Under the Federal Rules, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 239 (2015); Franklin 
Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 117 
(1996). 
12.  Physical screening would be one form of blinding.  For recent work 
on blinding in law and biomedical and forensic science, see MacLean & Dror, 
supra note 4.  See also, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Is Blind Hiring the Best Hir-
ing?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 25, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/magazine/is-blind-hiring-the-best-
hiring.html (proposing blinding to remedy lack of diversity in hiring).  The 
proposals of Pager and Blumenthal are discussed infra Part VI. 
3
 382 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
manuals to explain the rules of elite demeanor and its ideologi-
cal claim to truth.  Part III compares ancient and modern un-
derstanding of popular delivery; that is, choices in non-verbal 
communication that run counter to the elite rules and demon-
strate affiliation with non-elite groups as grounds for credibil-
ity.  Part IV shows how elite rules are enforced in law schools 
and courts, limiting how advocates can speak and, thus, what 
can be communicated.  Part V discusses the role of an assumed 
natural, common, bodily language in erasing the problem of ac-
tual differences and justifying the paradoxical claim that a jury 
can be manipulated by highly trained professionals, yet ferret 
out lies.  Part VI discusses benefits of the common adoption of 
elite demeanor and suggests improved instruction at laws 
schools and screening decision makers in litigation to reduce 
the cost. 
 
I. BACKGROUND: Classical Rhetoric’s Influence and 
Demeanor’s Deception 
 
Classical rhetoric, which evolved in tandem with trial and 
the democratic and republican political structures of ancient 
Athens and Rome, has been the foundation of western educa-
tion for over 2000 years.13  It is hard to overstate its influence 
in the ancient world, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment in 
Europe and the United States, and in the nineteenth century.14  
The enormous importance of classical studies in the United 
States, including rhetoric, has been summed up as “[n]ext to 
Christianity, the central intellectual project in America before 
the late nineteenth century was classicism.”15  Finally, classical 
 
13.  GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC & ITS CHRISTIAN AND 
SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 1-5 (1999); BRIAN 
VICKERS, IN DEFENCE OF RHETORIC vii-viii (1998). 
14.  See MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL 
RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 1-22 (2005); THOMAS HABINEK, ANCIENT 
RHETORIC AND ORATORY 79-100 (2005); ADAM KENDON, GESTURE: VISIBLE 
ACTION AS UTTERANCE 17-61 (2005); James J. Murphy, Quintilian’s Influence 
on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing in the Middle Ages and Renais-
sance, in ORAL AND WRITTEN COMMUNICATION: HISTORICAL APPROACHES 158, 
160-62 (Richard Leo Enos ed., 1990); Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical 
Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 615-16 (1999). 
15.  CAROLINE WINTERER, THE CULTURE OF CLASSICISM: ANCIENT GREECE 
AND ROME IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE 1780-1910 1 (2004).  See, e.g., 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1
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rhetorical theory is enjoying an explicit revival today.16  To the 
extent that this profound impact goes unrecognized,17 its influ-
ence is increased18—its rules seem self-evident as demonstrat-
ed in the next section.  Central to ancient instruction in rheto-
ric was the “science” of body language, or demeanor.19  
Traditionally called “delivery,” this branch of rhetorical theory 
concerns persuasion not through what is said, but through how 
it is said—the famous non-verbal persuasion. 
The crucial importance of non-verbal communication is of-
ten marked by quoting the Athenian orator Demosthenes’ fa-
mous quip that in competitive speaking, how a speaker com-
municates wins first, second, and third place.20  The same point 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LECTURES ON RHETORIC AND ORATORY (1810). 
16.  See, e.g., ROBERT N. SAYLER & MOLLY BISHOP SHADEL, TONGUE-TIED 
AMERICA: REVIVING THE ART OF VERBAL PERSUASION 13-27, 55-95, 111-27, 139-
45 (2011).  The authors are professors at the University of Virginia Law 
School.  Id. at xv.  
17.  “[L]aw lives in the speech of lawyers and clients [and] in the ges-
tures of attorneys and witnesses . . . . Notwithstanding our traditional incli-
nation to ignore them, these and other ‘alternative’ legal texts have always 
had presence and power.”  Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Motions: The Embod-
iment of Law in Gesture, 6 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 52 (1995) (discuss-
ing specific gestures that have been endowed with substantive legal mean-
ing). 
18.  For the legal profession’s “systematic denial” that it employs a par-
ticular rhetoric, see Wetlaufer, supra note 6, at 1555. 
19.  Delivery is the fifth canon, or part, of technical rhetoric and is, itself, 
divided into a number of subcategories.  Catherine Steel, Divisions of Speech, 
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ANCIENT RHETORIC 77, 81, 86-88 (Erik 
Gunderson ed., 2009) [hereinafter THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION].  
20.  See, e.g., QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA XI.iii.6 (Loeb Classical 
Library) (E.H. Warmington ed., H.E. Butler trans., 1968) [hereinafter 
QUINTILIAN]; CICERO, DE ORATORE III 213 (Loeb Classical Library) (T. E. Page 
ed., H. Rackham trans., 1942) [hereinafter DE OR]; CICERO, ORATOR xvii.56, in 
BRUTUS; ORATOR (Loeb Classical Library) (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1939).  See 
CICERO, RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM III.x.19 n.c (Loeb Classical Library) (T. E. 
Page ed., Harry Caplan trans., 1954).  Translations will be from these edi-
tions unless otherwise noted.  Citation to these and all ancient works will be 
to the traditional sections or line numbers of each work, as pages may differ 
in different translations.  Ray Nadeau, Delivery in Ancient Times: Homer to 
Quintilian, 50 Q. J. SPEECH 53 (1964).  The same story attributed to Cicero 
opens the first page of The Columbian Orator, widely read inside and outside 
of schools, including by Frederick Douglas.  CALEB BINGHAM, THE COLUMBIAN 
ORATOR 7-10 (1797).  “The book cover indicates that the United States Gov-
ernment authorized its publication by an Act of Congress in May 1797, for 
the specific purpose of ‘developing the fundamental art in and instilling the 
spirit of oratory among the youth of America.’”  Marguerite L. Butler, The Na-
5
 384 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
is made with percentages: “Only 7 percent of one’s message is 
communicated verbally; the remaining 93 percent is communi-
cated non-verbally through speech tenor and tone, body lan-
guage, and physical demeanor.”21  While discouraging, these 
warnings are usually a preface to instruction.22  For two mil-
lennia, the study of persuasive non-verbal communication has 
generated an outpouring of rules.  The deluge continues to-
day.23 
The centrality of legal demeanor derives from what 
Leubsdorf identifies as the first presupposition of trial: the 
commitment to presence and the human speaker.24  Trial has 
been an oral event since its beginning, with decision often pred-
icated on judgments about the speakers,’ including attorneys,’ 
credibility.25  The problems of this institutional commitment 
were recognized early.  Hippolytus, an influential tragedy of 
democratic Athens, stages the results of Theseus’ decision to 
find not credible a truthful verbal denial of an accusation of 
 
tional Frederick Douglass Moot Court Competition—Operating in the Spirit 
and Legacy of Frederick Douglass, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 66, 76 (2002).  The book 
recycles the precepts of classical rhetoric while adding passages from other 
sources.  Demosthenes’ formulation continues to have legs.  See, e.g., PAUL 
MARK SANDLER, RAISING THE BAR: PRACTICE TIPS AND TRIAL TECHNIQUE FOR 
YOUNG MARYLAND LAWYERS 119-137 (2005).  
21.  Jason Bloom & Karin Powdermaker, Building Rapport in the Court-
room, 69 TEX. B.J. 540, 540 (2006) (citations omitted). 
22.  See generally, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, Oral Argument and Impres-
sion Management: Harnessing the Power of Nonverbal Persuasion for a Judi-
cial Audience, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 631 (2009). 
23.  For example, entering “non-verbal communication” into a Google 
search returned 389,000 results (last updated Jan. 11, 2016).  
24.  Leubsdorf, supra note 7, at 1237.  For the centrality of oral evidence 
in the early criminal trial, see JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 236-37 (2003).  See generally, Keith Werhan, The Classical 
Athenian Ancestry of American Freedom of Speech, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293 
(2008). 
25.  For the orality of Athenian and Roman trial, see, e.g., 
ARISTOPHANES, THE WASPS 835-995, in ARISTOPHANES I (Loeb Classical Li-
brary) (G. P. Goold ed., Benjamin B. Rogers trans., 1978) (a parodic trial) and 
PLATO, SOCRATES’ DEFENSE (APOLOGY), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF 
PLATO 1-26 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns, eds., Hugh Tredennick 
trans., 1961) (Socrates’ speech at his trial).  Forensic (that is, legal) oratory 
was one of three subdivisions of classical rhetoric.  ARISTOTLE, “ART” OF  
RHETORIC § 1358a-b (Loeb Classical Library) (J.H. Freese trans., 1982).  See 
generally, Jon Hesk, Types of Oratory, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra 
note 19, at 145, 150-56.  
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1
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rape.26  This credibility determination is dispositive.  As a re-
sult, his son, the innocent Hippolytus, dies.27  Hippolytus’ un-
just death and Theseus’ mistake—believing the truth to be a 
lie—derive from a fatal shortcoming in human speech: it bears 
no mark of truth or falsity.28  Instead, Theseus can only wish 
that “[a]ll men should have two voices”–one for unjust state-
ments, the other for the truth—so “we should never be de-
ceived.”29  The Greek word for voice (phone) focuses not on con-
tent, but on pitch and tone.30  Conviction and death of the 
innocent raise a terrible possibility: these two voices do not ex-
ist.  Yet the promise of delivery and assessment of demeanor 
credibility–central to the structure of the Athenian and the 
American legal systems—is, in essence, that they do.  Funda-
mental to the structure of trial and modern appeal is the pre-
supposition that the body and voice of the speaker can, and 
must, function as the touchstone of truth.31 
 
26.   EURIPIDES, supra note 3, at 885, 942, 1036 ff. (Citation is by line 
number.) 
27.  Id. at 1162.  
28.  The play “focuses the audience’s attention on their own (actual or 
potential) role as citizen-jurors in Athens’ lawcourts.”  JON HESK, DECEPTION 
AND DEMOCRACY IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 277 (2006).  
29.  EURIPIDES, supra note 3, at 924-31.  
30.  HENRY G. LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 
1967-68 (1894). 
31.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a) requires the reviewing 
court to “give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witness-
es’ credibility.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).  “[D]emeanor of an orally-testifying 
witness is ‘always assumed to be in evidence.’ It is ‘wordless language.’”  
Broad. Music v. Havana Madrid Rest. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949).  
Standards of review favor trial courts’ observations of demeanor.  Inwood 
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).  The Seventh Circuit 
in United States v. Nobles stated: 
 
The trial judge has the best opportunity to observe the ver-
bal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the 
subject’s reactions and responses to the interrogatories, 
their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, 
posture, and body movements, as well as confused or nerv-
ous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the 
cold pages of an appellate record. We refuse to second-guess 
the trial judge on matters of credibility . . . . 
United States v. Nobles, 69 F.3d 172, 181 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).  
However, if “credibility determinations rest, not on demeanor of which the 
judge was the sole observer, but on an analysis of testimony . . . [,] [they] de-
7
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Yet demeanor credibility simply does not work.  The belief 
that truth can be adequately detected, at least in a legal con-
text, from the body, is largely false.  As first discussed in Well-
born’s landmark article in 1991,32 most people detect truth or 
lies at a rate almost equal to chance—one influential research-
er puts the figure at 56.6 percent—and are “particularly poor at 
detecting lies (correctly judging that someone was lying: 44% 
accuracy rate).”33  The rate may be somewhat better for “pro-
fessional lie catchers,” falling between 55 and 66 percent.34  
“[T]he most basic reason for the failure to detect lies is that 
there is no single verbal, nonverbal, or physiological cue 
uniquely related to deception.”35  Even if universal bodily ex-
pressions of emotion exist, a strong cultural overlay influences 
both the physical expressions themselves and the ability to 
read them, particularly in individuals from other cultures.36  
 
serve less than usual deference.”  Consolidation Coal Co. v. N.L.R.B., 669 
F.2d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1982).  See Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored 
Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373, 375-76 (2005).  
32.  See Wellborn, supra note 3, at 1088; see also Renée McDonald 
Hutchins, You Can’t Handle the Truth! Trial Juries and Credibility, 44 
SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 508 (2014); Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and 
Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 837 (2011); Pager, supra note 31, at 
379-92; Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The 
Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. 
REV. 1157, 1188-92 (1993).  Paul Ekman points out the many constraints on 
bodily lie detection; not only do “behavioral hot spots,” or micro expressions, 
only indicate an emotion that is departure for investigation, they are mani-
fest in only 50 percent of liars.  Paul Ekman, Lie Catching and Microexpres-
sions, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF DECEPTION 118, 132 (Clancy Martin ed., 2009) 
(emphasis omitted).  For new strategies, see, e.g., William A. Woodruff, Evi-
dence of Lies and Rules of Evidence: The Admissibility of Fmri-Based Expert 
Opinion of Witness Truthfulness, 16 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 105 (2014), and Julie 
A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 443 (2008).  But see generally 
James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903 (2000) (sup-
porting credibility determinations). 
33.  Aldert Vrij, Nonverbal Communication and Deception, in THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 341, 349 (Valerie Manusov & 
Miles L. Patterson eds., 2006).  
34.  Id. at 350-51. 
35.  Id. 
36.  There may be universal expressions of certain emotions, modified, 
however, by a cultural overlay. See generally David Matsumoto & Hyi Sung 
Hwang, Cultural Influences on Nonverbal Behavior, in NONVERBAL 
COMMUNICATION, SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 97-120 (David Matsumoto, Mark 
G. Frank, Hyi Sung Hwang, eds., 2013).  The specifics of gestures are even 
more culturally determined, as is the meaning of gaze, particularly its direct-
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1
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Further, legal institutions “over-rely upon visual cues to their 
own detriment: visual information diminishes accuracy.”37  
Paul Ekman, probably the preeminent authority on physical 
signs of deceit and coiner of the widely used term “leakage” to 
describe the physical clues of emotion and deceit,38 has stated: 
“Anyone who says there is an absolutely reliable sign of lying 
that is always present when someone lies and never present 
when someone is truthful is either misguided or a charlatan.”39 
 
II: ELITE DEMEANOR AND TRUTH 
 
The agreement that demeanor is critical obscures the fact 
that the rhetorical rules applied in courtrooms today emerged 
from an intense, and often bloody, struggle for dominance in 
Athens and Rome, played out in part through contrasting elite 
and popular rhetoric, including contrasting demeanors.40  Even 
when the influence of ancient rhetoric is recognized, reception 
of this theory continues to be uncritical, and the theory itself is 
sanitized of its roots in ancient class and political struggles.41  
Yet theory and practice are permeated by values and claims 
that drove struggle.42  And traditional advice incorporates them 
into modern practitioners and legal practice.  The dominant 
elite tradition successfully imposed aristocratic, upper class 
demeanor, including the physical habits of wealthy foot sol-
diers, as natural and linked to rationality and truth.43  Writers 
 
ness. David Matsumoto & Hyi Sung Hwang, Body and Gestures, in 
NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION, SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 77-83 (David 
Matsumoto, Mark G. Frank, Hyi Sung Hwang, eds., 2013).  
37.  Pager, supra note 31, at 391 (emphasis added).  See Vrij, supra note 
33, at 352. 
38.  Paul Ekman & Wallace Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to 
Deception, 32 PSYCHIATRY 88 (1969) (using the term “leakage”). 
39.  Ekman, supra note 32, at 133.  
40.  See DAPHNE O’REGAN, RHETORIC, COMEDY AND THE VIOLENCE OF 
LANGUAGE IN ARISTOPHANES’ CLOUDS 9-13 (1992) (discussing the early part of 
this period).  See generally JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC 
ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE (1989) (showcas-
ing a somewhat optimistic view). 
41.  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137 An Introduction to Persuasion in the Court-
room: What Makes a Trial Lawyer Convincing? §§ 34-37 (1999). 
42.  See infra Parts II and III. 
43.  See infra Section II.A. 
9
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in the same elite tradition damned non-elite, democratic 
speakers as using artificial skills, including delivery, based on 
irrationality and emotion.44 
 
A. The Dominant Tradition: Credible Speaker as 
Elite Warrior 
Strength and power are the foundation of the elite speak-
er’s credibility.45  Thus, a twentieth century manual exhorts 
the advocate: 
 
You must make a “neutral stance” your new hab-
it. Stand squarely with feet approximately 
shoulder-width apart. Let your hands land at 
your sides. Don’t lock your knees; and put your 
weight on the balls of your feet. This is a very au-
thoritative way of standing in front of an audi-
ence. You can make natural hand gestures from 
this position, but it will help you to remain solid 
and grounded . . . Although you might feel un-
comfortable at first, you will look confident. Su-
perfluous movement only damages your argu-
ment, and your credibility.46 
 
A proper advocate stands as a fighter; his argument and 
delivery are described as one.47  Improper gestures not only 
 
44.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, §§ 1403b-1404a.  Section 1404a links de-
livery to deficiency and emotional appeals starting with the sophist Thra-
symachus.  Id. § 1404a.  The sophists were the theoreticians of democratic 
rhetoric at Athens.  KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 18, 23.  
45.  Experiments have shown “eyewitness confidence, rather than accu-
racy, was the identified predictor of juror belief.”  Wellborn, supra note 3, at 
1090.  
46.  Leonard Matheo & Lisa DeCaro, The Eleven Most Frequently-Asked 
Questions About Courtroom Presentation and Performance, in ALI-ABA’S 
PRACTICE CHECKLIST MANUAL FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY 171 (2001).  For a compen-
dium of precepts that provide additional sources for much advice discussed in 
this section and the next, see Jansen Voss, Student Article, The Science of 
Persuasion: An Exploration of Advocacy and the Science Behind the Art of 
Persuasion in the Courtroom, 29 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 301 (2005).   
47.  The martial ideal of the elite advocate invokes courage, associated 
with justice, as one of the four cardinal virtues.  See Judith Resnik & Dennis 
Curtis, Epistemological Doubt and Visual Puzzles of Sight, Knowledge and 
Judgment: Reflections on Clear-Sighted and Blindfolded Justices, in 
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damage credibility, but the argument itself.  The extent to 
which elite delivery is that of a warrior and the underlying sig-
nificance of this paradigm emerge even more clearly in the fol-
lowing celebratory description of an advocate before the Su-
preme Court: 
 
She stands erect behind the podium, her feet to-
gether. She speaks in a low, yet clearly pitched, 
voice. She does not gesture. She is completely as-
sured, totally prepared, meticulous in her 
knowledge of the details of her argument. And 
she is utterly convincing. When the justices que-
ry her, she listens attentively, head slightly 
bowed. Her answers show she has understood 
the questions and appreciates their force. She 
does not shrink from the challenges. She knows 
this battle will not be won in a day. She is pre-
pared for a long campaign.48 
 
The advocate embodies the requirements of elite delivery.  
Her low voice and immobility represent courtroom decorum at 
its strictest; her body conveys the primacy of mind.  Her re-
straint appeals to and underwrites beliefs about the proper lim-
its of motive and persuasion that reinforce the court’s claim to 
rationality and impartiality.  The stripped-down body models 
the “ideal” legal discourse: one that privileges universalization, 
not personal experience; social rules, not individual situations; 
and reason, not emotion.49  Within the classical and modern  
 
GENEALOGIES OF LEGAL VISION 238-39 (Peter Goodrich & Valerie Hayaert 
eds., 2015); PLATO, LACHES §§ 190d, 198a, 199d, in THE COLLECTED 
DIALOGUES 132, 141, 143 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Benja-
min Jowett trans., 1961); Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
1207, 1230 (2012).  Maroney links the higher status of anger as an emotion to 
the ancient discussions of anger that focus on treatment of slaves versus 
treatment of equals.  Id. at 1219-24.  
48.  Herma Hill Kay, Equal Treatment, AM. LAW., Dec. 6, 1999, at 72. 
49.  This parallels physically the linguistic attributes that Bourdieu 
identifies as creating a “neutralization effect” on the language to “establish 
the speaker as universal subject, at once impartial and objective”: “indicative 
mood . . . verbs in the present and past third person, . . . the factual, . . . in-
definites . . . the intemporal present . . . transsubjective values presupposing 
the existence of an ethical consensus[,] . . . fixed formulas and locutions.”  
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rhetorical/legal culture, such elite delivery plays a fundamental 
role in establishing decisions as compelled by legal reasoning 
and rules whose goal is truth.  It befits the Supreme Court, a 
forum conceived of as dedicated to pure argument over legal 
principles before an audience of the legal elite. 
This praise incarnates the speaker as hero.  The fact that 
the passage describes a woman, in virtually unchanged tradi-
tional terms, demonstrates social flexibility – women may in-
carnate the classical ideal of power and truth50—and the con-
tinuing vitality of the classical model – in fact, they must do so, 
if they wish to be recognized as rational speakers, at least in 
elite rhetorical fora.51  The price this exacts from legal partici-
pants and institutions is discussed below.  Here, what is of in-
terest is the rooting of credibility, in both ancient and modern 
norms, in the ability to defend oneself and one’s words.52  This 
advocate will not be intimidated by “force” or “challenges;” she 
is in for the “long campaign.”  Nothing will vary her message, 
 
Pierre Bourdieu & Richard Terdiman, The Force Of Law: Toward A Sociology 
Of The Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 820 (1987).  See Wetlaufer, su-
pra note 6, at 1558-62, for similar characteristics designed to win by sup-
pressing the possibility of alternative interpretations or perspectives on a le-
gal problem and representing the desired outcome as required by the rule of 
law, not men.  For the construction of this impersonal legal voice see J. Chris-
topher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in Legal Writing, 15 LEGAL WRITING 
67, 99-100 (2009). 
50.  Likewise, John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, authors of Just 
Words, show that many women and poor or uneducated men speak “a lan-
guage of deference, subordination, and nonassertiveness, whereas others [in-
cluding some women] spoke in a more rhetorically forceful style.”  JOHN M. 
CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS 65 (2d ed. 2005).  Powerless lan-
guage, “associated primarily with the speaker’s status in society,” was less 
likely to be believed.  Id.  For “women lawyers’ talk [a]s role behavior rather 
than gendered behavior, with little difference between men and women law-
yers,” see Bryna Bogoch, Gendered Lawyering: Difference and Dominance in 
Lawyer-Client Interaction, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 677, 677 (1997). 
51.  Elite lawyers understand the power of conforming to the ancient 
paradigm particularly when they are female, minority, or otherwise outside 
the traditional paradigm.  See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY (2014) (dis-
cussing the importance of conservative attire); SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY 
BELOVED WORLD 229 (2013) (discussing the advantages of reasoning and talk-
ing like a man).   
52.  In women, “low, even” voice and “imposing height and voice” allow a 
female attorney to be “intimidating” and endow her with “physical signs of 
commanding presence” that enhance her credibility and effectiveness.  SAM 
SCHRAGER, THE TRIAL LAWYER’S ART 131-32 (1999). 
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the consistency of which she can vouch for in her person. 
 
1. Displaying Power: Gestures That Guarantee 
Truthfulness 
The overlap of truthful speaker and successful warrior has 
ancient roots.  In classical rhetoric, the orator “is usually hero-
ic . . . ; he imposes his will on others. In contrast the role of the 
speaker is much less emphasized in the rhetoric of India or 
China, where harmony rather than victory is often the goal.  
The classical orator is a fighter in a lonely contest.”53  
“[R]hetoric is the special speech of the state . . . the occupation 
of off-duty soldiers.”54  The connection goes back at least to the 
Iliad.  There, Achilles, pre-eminent in words and deeds,55 is the 
only truthful speaker because he alone cannot be intimidated.56  
His martial and rhetorical exploits define the realm of human 
 
53.  KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 10.  For martial metaphors and the ad-
versarial system, see Adam Arms, Metaphor, Women and Law, 10 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 257 (1999); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How 
Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 225 (1995); Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. 
REV. 1053 (1989). 
54.  HABINEK, supra note 14, at 2, 65-66.  The individual fighting on foot 
“valorized facing danger, standing one’s ground, and cooperating with fellow 
soldiers, and relished victory (preferably quick) in a well-regulated, open, 
face-to-face confrontation.”  JOSEPH ROISMAN, THE RHETORIC OF MANHOOD: 
MASCULINITY IN THE ATTIC ORATORS 106 (2005).  Superior manhood and supe-
rior social class were associated.  See id. at 85-88, 95-104.  “[P]overty [w]as a 
liability in the attainment of manhood,” particularly in the courts, where the 
poor man was considered at a “moral disadvantage.”  Id. at 95, 97.  See Erik 
Gunderson, Discovering the Body in Roman Oratory, in PARCHMENTS OF 
GENDER 7, 170 (Maria Wyke ed., 1998); Fritz Graf, Gestures and Conventions: 
The Gesture of Roman Actors and Orators, in A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
GESTURE 44-45 (Jan Bremmer & Herman Roodenburg eds., 1991).  A speak-
er’s training was conceptualized as like that of a soldier.  In QUINTILIAN, su-
pra note 20, at XI.iii.19, a proper masculine voice is achieved through walk-
ing, massage, abstinence from sex, easy digestion of foods, that is, 
“frugalitas.”  These are regimes of an athlete, a warrior, and a philosopher, 
scaled down to more attainable level.  Those who fail run the risk of “the ‘fee-
ble shrillness’ that characterizes the voices of ‘eunuchs, women and invalids.’”  
Id.  See also ERIK GUNDERSON, STAGING MASCULINITY 81-82 (2000); MAUD W. 
GLEASON, MAKING MEN: SOPHISTS AND SELF-PRESENTATION IN ANCIENT ROME 
119 (1995).  
55.  HOMER, THE ILIAD IX 443 (Richmond Lattimore trans., 1965) [here-
inafter THE ILIAD]. 
56.  Id. at I 120-220.  VICKERS, supra note 13, at 3-6 cites references to 
Homer in ancient rhetorical theory. 
13
 392 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
excellence, not as alternatives, but as an organic whole.  For 
the audience, one lesson is clear: ability to defend one’s speech 
is a predicate for trust. 
The credible speaker must be invulnerable to inner, as well 
as outer, pressures.57  As rhetorical theory and practice devel-
oped, one example became Pericles, aristocratic leader of newly 
democratic Athens.58  Pericles’ self-presentation was designed 
to illustrate his power, and his power over himself.  He was 
famous for self-restraint, composure uncorrupted by emotion, a 
quiet and even voice, and movements that left even the rela-
tively loose Greek garments unruffled.59  His reputation for ab-
solute freedom from fear and desire was enhanced by his aris-















57.  “[S]elf-control enabled men to resist the undesirable and incapaci-
tating influences of desire and, hence, to behave morally . . . Lack of restraint 
detracted from one’s manliness and was regarded as a source of danger to 
other men, their values, and their institutions.”  ROISMAN, supra note 54, at 
184.  
58.  Of course, Pericles’ character did not go unchallenged.  His enemies 
associated him with the new popular rhetoric, and he was notorious for his 
association with the sophists.  O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 11-15, 56-57.  
59.  PLUTARCH, PERICLES § V.1 (Loeb Classical Library) (Bernadotte Per-
rin trans., 1916).  For Pericles’ legendary self-control, see id. §§ V, VII.4.  In 
the year that his sister, son, many relatives, and friends died of the plague, 
he was recorded as weeping only once: when he laid a funeral wreath on the 
grave of his last living legitimate son.  Id. § XXXVI.5.  PAUL ZANKER, THE 
MASK OF SOCRATES 27 (ALAN SHAPIRO, trans., 1995) also links this story to 
Pericles’ bust.  
60.  PLUTARCH, supra note 59, §§ III.1, VII.1, X, XVI.3.  
Figure 1 
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Pericles’ bust, Figure 1,61 represents this elite ideal.62  Per-
icles is shown with a helmet, symbolizing military command.63  
His face is regular and smooth, unemotional and symmetrical.  
The identity of the bust has been known since antiquity64 with 
its “idealized yet distinctive” features.65  The lack of physical 
idiosyncrasies and the stern composure convey the message 
that Pericles’ words are not personal, although they emerge 
from an identifiable person.  Instead, in the body of Pericles, 
the viewer sees the picture of rational civic discourse, speaking 
for the public good, turned aside neither by fear nor favor.66 
The overlap of warrior and speaker begins with stance.  
Standard modern advice was given above.  Ancient treatises 
agree that credibility begins with a stance that “should be up-
right, . . .  feet level and a slight distance apart, or the left may 
be very slightly advanced.  The knees should be upright, but 
not stiff, the shoulder relaxed, the face stern, but not sad, ex-
pressionless or languid: the arms should be held slightly away 
from the sides.”67  The advice is Cicero’s.  Once he began, Cice-
ro’s ideal orator would have a strong and manly posture de-
rived from armed conflicts or, at least, the gymnasium.68 
Posture is critical.  Aristotle codified the social and politi-
cal “naturalness” of the connection between “good” posture and 
rationality in his justification of social hierarchy and slavery.  
 
61.  This picture is of a Roman copy of the bust from a statute of Peri-
cles.  The bust is at the Vatican Museums.  The image is available on Wiki-
media Commons.  File: Pericles Pio-Clementino, WIKIMEDIACOMMONS, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pericles_Pio-
Clementino_Inv269_n2.jpg (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). 
62.  Beth Cohen, Perikles’ Portrait and the Riace Bronzes: New Evidence 
for “Schinocephaly,” 60 HESPERIA: J. AM. SCH. CLASSICAL STUD. AT ATHENS 
465, 469 (1991). 
63.  Id. at 470. 
64.  Id. at 465-66, 469. 
65.  Id. at 466. 
66.  Pericles’ bust and a statue of a poet erected by Pericles are “imag-
es[s] of a model citizen of High Classical Athenian society.”  ZANKER, supra 
note 59 at 27.  It was “Pericles himself who set the standard of behavior.”  Id.  
For Pericles’ indifference to public opinion, see PLUTARCH, PERICLES supra 
note 59, §§ XXXI.5- XXXII.1, XXXVI.3. 
67.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.159 
68.  DE OR, supra note 20, at III.lix.220; quoted by QUINTILIAN, supra 
note 20, at XI.iii.122.  
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Given that mind should rule over body, and rational over irra-
tional, those who are more body are natural slaves, while those 
who are more mind should be masters.  Posture marks the dif-
ference; good posture indicates the superiority of mind.  “Na-
ture would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen 
and slaves, making one strong for servile labour, the other up-
right, and although useless for such services, useful for political 
life in the arts both of war and peace,” that is fighting and 
speaking.69  The tight connection between class, successful vio-
lence, credible argument, rationality, and posture lives on in 
modern advice.  “Keep the weight evenly distributed on both 
feet; you will feel more steady.  Indeed, when weight is not 
evenly distributed, you are unbalanced and an easy pushover 
for someone on the attack.”70  “Slouching or leaning . . . may 
telegraph to the fact finders a feeling of physical weakness or 
instability.  This association may carry over to the fact finders’ 
perceptions of the lawyer’s case.”71  “[T]he goal is a relaxed but 
erect posture that conveys an aura of composure and com-
mand.”72 
A measured walk is also necessary and revealing.73  
“[W]hile one man’s gait reveals his composure and the atten-
tion he gives to his conduct, another’s reveals his inner disor-
 
69.  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1254b 25-30 in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
(Richard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941).  In a concession to ob-
servation that does not trouble his theory, he acknowledges that Nature can 
make a mistake so that “some have the souls and others have the bodies of 
freemen.”  Id.  
70.  Constance Bernstein, Winning Trials Nonverbally: Six Ways to Es-
tablish Control in the Courtroom, 30 TRIAL 61, 63 (Jan. 1994).  See also 
LAWRENCE J. SMITH & LORETTA A. MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION 
STRATEGIES 69 (1985). 
71.  PETER MURRAY, BASIC TRIAL ADVOCACY 78 (1995).  Judges are in-
cluded as understanding posture as argument.  “A slouching attorney gives 
an impression of sloppiness, which might cause a judge to be skeptical of 
what he has to say.”  6 AM. JUR. TRIALS 771 Nonjury Summation § 23 (2006).  
72.  Steven Wisotsky, Speak With Style and Authority, 37:2 LITIG. 16, 17 
(Winter 2011).  See also, SAYLER & SHADEL, supra note 16, at 67-70 (offering 
the same advice). 
73.  Graf, supra note 54, at 47; Jan Bremmer, Walking, Standing, and 
Sitting in Ancient Greek Culture, in A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GESTURE 16-23 
(Jan Bremmer & Herman Roodenburg eds., 1991).  On the cultural signifi-
cance of walking in Rome, see ANTHONY CORBEILL, NATURE EMBODIED: 
GESTURE IN ANCIENT ROME, 107-37 (2004).  See also CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 
I.xxxvi.131 (Loeb Classical Library) (Walter Miller trans., 1951). 
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der and lack of self-restraint.”74  “The orderly man reveals his 
self-restraint through his deportment: he is deep-voiced and 
slow-stepping, and his eyes, neither fixed nor rapidly blinking, 
hold a certain indefinably courageous gleam.”75  Roman rhetor-
ical rules frown on pacing, swaying, and foot tapping.76  Mod-
ern speakers are advised to “[a]void all unnatural and distract-
ing mannerisms.77 This includes pacing back and forth 
uncontrollably, a movement that is highly distracting to jurors.  
Most of the advocate’s movement during her courtroom speech 
should be restricted to the upper body. This still leaves plenty 
of room for physical expression.”78  As Ball puts it, “[s]tillness 
conveys confidence and strength.”79  Conversely, fidgeting im-
plies deception and weakness.80 
The credible speaker “will also use gestures in such a way 
as to avoid excess: he will maintain an erect and lofty car-
riage.”81  “He will control himself by the pose of his whole 
frame, and the vigorous and manly attitude of the body, ex-
tending the arm in moments of passion and dropping it in 
 
74.  GLEASON, supra note 54, at 61 (translating DIO CHRYSOSTOM, 
ORATIONS 32.54). 
75.  Id. (translating and citing Anonymous Latini).  See Bremmer, supra 
note 73, at 45; QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.112. 
76.  See QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.124 (regarding errors in 
stance).  Running is disallowed, as is standing on one foot, shifting the 
weight, and swaying.  Id. at IX.iii.128.  This is to avoid an effeminate man-
ner.  Warnings against pacing as reflecting poorly on the advocate’s self-
control and argument abound in the modern literature.  See, e.g., 72 AM. JUR. 
TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 59.  “When you are on your feet, keep your 
weight evenly balanced on both legs . . . When you take a step, take it for a 
purpose . . . . [I]f you are not actually going somewhere, stand still . . . You rid 
yourself of wriggles, fidgets, and pointless wandering by monitoring yourself 
all the time . . . .”  DAVID BALL, THEATER TIPS AND STRATEGIES FOR JURY 
TRIALS 8-9 (3d ed. 2003). 
 77. CICERO, ORATOR, supra note 20, at 59. 
78.  W. Ray Persons, Preparing and Delivering the Defense Closing Ar-
gument, 16 NO. 3 PRAC. LITIGATOR 55, 60 (2005). 
79.  BALL, supra note 76, at 5.  
80.  Thus, a liar “fidgets when answering critical questions, his eyes 
shift from the floor to the ceiling, and he manifests all other indicia tradition-
ally attributed to perjurers.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
270 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  See also Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Do-
minion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 855 F.2d 963, 974 (2d Cir. 1988).  
81.  CICERO, ORATOR, supra note 20, at 59. 
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calmer moods.”82  Excessive movement must be avoided, as 
should rapid, small, or overly large gesticulation.  Quintilian 
prohibits “[a]ny frenetic movements . . . or wild gesticula-
tion . . . . Gesticulation has only limited amplitude: the hand 
should never be raised higher than the eyes or lower than the 
chest, and it should never move further to the left than the 
shoulders.”83  Modern rules require the same restricted range 
for acceptable gestures: 
 
Keep your hands in their own quadrants. Think 
of your body as being divided by a horizontal line 
at shoulder level and by a vertical line that bi-
sects you in front from top to bottom. Don’t let 
your right hand cross the vertical line to the left 
or your left hand cross to the right, or you will 
seem to be defensively closing yourself off. Don’t 
let either hand rise above the horizontal line at 
your shoulders. If it does, it is going up there for 
no good purpose (catching a fly, or touching your 
face—or worse).84 
 
Gesture, too, is given moral significance that, in turn, is 
conceptualized as central to its credibility.  Graf sums up the 
approach of the ancient sources: 
 
Moderation in movement is . . .  peculiar to a free 
man . . . a free man is not only a social category, 
it is a way of living, thinking, and being; being a 
free man means also having a free 
soul. . . . Strictly moderated and limited gestures, 
then, are an indication of moderate and self-
controlled character.85 
 
82.  Id. at 59-60. 
83.  Graf, supra note 54, at 46 (summarizing QUINTILIAN, supra note 20).   
84.  BALL, supra note 76, at 6-7.  Likewise, touching the face is “look[ing] 
like you are trying to hide something other than your face—such as the 
truth.”  Id.  See RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM, supra note 20, at III.xv.27; 
QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.123.   
85.  Graf, supra note 54, at 47 (summarizing ancient views).  Tradition-
ally, moderation was not a virtue for the poor.  PLATO, CHARMIDES § 161, in 
THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns 
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The modern “Inverse Gesture Rule”86 relies on the same 
understanding: “Using many gestures means speakers need 
help with what they are saying; using only a few gestures along 
with good word choice means to jurors that those words can 
stand alone.”87  The Rule clearly positions gesture within the 
mind/body duality: more body equals less mind; less body 
equals more mind. 
Advice about other symbols of class and power clarifies the 
cultural matrix that shapes “natural” indicators of credibility.  
The advocate’s attire should be manly.88  Before speaking, he 
should “rise with deliberation,89 . . . secure a moment for reflex-
ion[sic], [and] devote a brief space to arrangement of [the] to-
ga.”90  Arranging the toga made conspicuous the speaker’s 
membership in the dominant class: free, male citizens, socially 
and financially secure.  Today, a suit is obligatory to evoke the 
jurors’ habit of obedience: “dark suits warn[sic] by lawyers 
symbolize serious work . . . ; classic silk ties are a clue to the 
lawyer’s supposed station in life; a strong voice with certain 
resonant qualities give[sic] a cue to power within the speak-
er.”91  Like rearranging the toga, foregrounding the suit has a 
clear purpose: 
 
eds., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1961).  Gleason discusses Seneca’s idea that 
“[a] man’s stride reveals the condition of his soul,” especially his masculinity, 
and is closely related to his voice.  GLEASON, supra note 54, at 113.  The indi-
vidual elements of delivery entail each other.  For a similar overlapping in 
which an uneven voice is compared to a limping gait, see QUINTILIAN, supra 
note 20, at XI.iii.43. 
86.  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 16. 
87.  Id. 
88.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.137. 
89.  “Then, when authorized by the court, rise slowly but deliberately 
and approach the jury in a calm and steadfast manner. After addressing the 
court – pause! Do not plunge immediately into the presentation. Allow the 
jury a momentary opportunity to observe you and your countenance.”  Per-
sons, supra note 78, at 59.  “The short pause before the commencement of ad-
dress is a time-honored technique of outstanding speakers and advocates of 
all kinds. It lends itself especially well to the courtroom setting.”  Id. at 60.  
See also 72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 58. 
90.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.156.  “It is a good idea for a man 
to keep his suit jacket open while sitting and button it on rising to address a 
judge or jury for a major speech. The act of buttoning it seems to project a 
message of serious intent.”  ROBERTO ARON ET AL., TRIAL COMMUNICATION 
SKILLS § 4.08, 4-16 (1996).   
91.  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 43. 
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[to] create in other the desire for obedience . . . . 
Obedience, taught from the cradle, carries for-
ward into the political, legal, military, religious, 
and familial structures of our na-
tion. . . . [O]beying authority figures who control 
rewards and punishment in various relationships 
(family, work, etc.) proves advantageous to most 
people, as does obeying those authority figures 
who have greater wisdom.92 
The conventional invocation of wisdom to conclude a recital 
of power justifies elite delivery and explains its claim.  The 
quotations illustrate the overlap between power, credibility, 
and truth that shape the elite norm.  Only those who must be 
obeyed can be trusted because they, alone, have the autonomy 
to speak truth.93 
 
92.  Id.  The idea that the habit of obedience is important and should be 
invoked by attorneys is common.  Smith & Malandro candidly pointed out: 
“The basic human response to authority is automatic and instinctive. Most 
people defer to authority figures allowing them to influence both their behav-
iors and decisions. Jurors particularly seek out authority figures in the court-
room to guide their responses. This explains, in part, the success of the ‘act as 
if’ technique.”  SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 251-52.  A few sentences 
later, “believability” is tied elite delivery.  “To increase the perception of cred-
ibility, first increase the perception of authority . . . through changes in per-
sonal appearance, voice, and behavioral cues.”  Id. at 252.  “Instinctive” above 
naturalizes learned responses to signals of power.  This down-to-earth pas-
sage dispenses with the conventional nicety of filtering the result through 
wisdom or truth. 
93.  To manifest strength is thus the underlying imperative of elite de-
meanor rules.  As will be discussed below, the opposite is also true: vulnera-
bility, betrayed by non-elite gestures, begets lies:  
 
Confidence gestures are crucial for advocates who wish to be 
discerned as poised and in control of the situation. These 
gestures are identified (1) as not exhibiting gestures that 
show lack of confidence, and (2) showing certain gestures 
that exhibit confidence. For example, (1) not scratching or 
touching the head or covering the mouth, having downcast 
eyes, indirect body orientation, closed bodily posture, or (2) 
having excellent posture with chin slightly raised and show-
ing the power gesture and the open palm (“I have nothing to 
hide.”). 
84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 Body Language for Trial Lawyers: Persuasive Gestures, 
Postures, and Foot Movement in the Courtroom § 18 (2016). 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1
 2017 EYING THE BODY TO FIND TRUTH 399 
 
B. How Liars Look: Physical Vulnerability and Men-
tal Weakness 
Deviations from elite practice are not simply non-verbal 
mistakes.  Failure to follow elite rules ties the speaker and his 
words to females, the insane, the poor, children, slaves, and the 
powerless.94  Ancients and moderns distrust the speech of the 
weak as potentially deceptive and irrational,95 and prey to the 
violence of others and the speaker’s own need and desire.96 
The Iliad set the stage when Thersites, an ordinary sol-
dier, dares to speak in the army council to argue for the com-
mon soldiers’ interests.97  The inappropriate nature of his 
speech is expressed in physical terms that have continued to 
resonate in rhetorical practice.  Thersites is bow-legged, lame, 
round-shouldered, and bald, with a shrill voice.98  His non-elite 
body and voice, the opposite of the deep voice, strong legs, and 
luxuriant hair characteristic of heroic leaders, identify Thersi-
tes with his audience, the mass of infantry.  Thus, Thersites 
becomes a precursor of popular delivery, that is, delivery that 
emphasizes its affiliation with the non-elite audience and re-
jects elite rules of non-verbal behavior. 
Thersites’ reception illustrates the fundamental problem 
with non-elite speakers: their words are at the mercy of others.  
Thersites is weak.  The heroic Odysseus first insults him and 
 
94.  “Cicero and Quintilian are policemen of behavior and style, encour-
aging students to cultivate a ‘naturally’ masculine attitude, and punishing 
those who had the look and sound of the slave, the foreigner, the ill-educated 
man, or the woman.”  Joy Connolly, The Politics of Rhetorical Education, in 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ANCIENT RHETORIC 126, 135 (Erik Gunderson ed., 
2009) (citation omitted).  
95.  For contemporary distrust of powerless language, see CONLEY & 
O’BARR, supra note 50, at 60. 
96.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, § 1354b, 1369b-1370a.  On the two types 
of pleasure, one associated reason, the other with the body and the irrational, 
see id. § 1370.  On a similar connection among truth telling, status, and con-
trol of the appetites in discussion of jurors and witnesses in the thirteenth 
century, see Fisher, supra note 9, at 589.  Those likely to lie included: “slaves, 
women (in certain circumstances) those below the age of fourteen, the insane, 
the infamous, paupers, infidels, [and] criminals.”  Id. at 590. 
97.  THE ILIAD, supra note 55, at II.211-277.  For Thersites as repre-
sentative of a non-elite perspective, see, e.g., Peter W. Rose, Thersites and the 
Plural Voices of Homer, 21 ARETHUSA 5 (1988).  
98.  THE ILIAD, supra note 55, II.216-219.  
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orders him to be silent.99  He ends by clubbing Thersites, 
threatening to strip him naked and expose his genitals (the ul-
timate sign of human physicality) should he speak again.100  
Thersites is left weeping, bloody, and cowering silently on the 
ground.101  The fact that Thersites was merely repeating points 
Achilles made earlier foregrounds the extent to which the reac-
tion to his speech is driven by its speaker, not its content.  As 
Quintilian candidly remarks, not Thersites’ speech, but its 
speaker, made his words laughable.102  Thus, Thersites is the 
precursor to the figure in Figure 2, a figurine of a slave from 




99.  Id. at II.245-60. 
100.  Id. at II.260-65.  These are unique phrases in epic and draw extra, 
negative attention to Thersites’ body.  See G.S. KIRK, THE ILIAD: A 
COMMENTARY, VOL. 1: BOOKS 1-4, 143 (1985).  
101.  THE ILIAD, supra note 55, at II.267-69. 
102.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.i.37.  Quintilian’s remark indi-
cates that Thersites is a comic figure, and as such “think[s] with [his] bod[y], 
not with [his] head[]: fear is registered in the bowels, and desire in the stom-
ach . . . . [I]t is the posture and particularly the set of the shoulders that tells 
us what the mask is thinking.”  David Wiles, The Poetics of the Mask in Old 
Comedy, in PERFORMANCE, ICONOGRAPHY, RECEPTION 374, 382 (Martin 
Revermann & Peter Wilson eds., 2008). 
103.  Bronze statuette of a comic actor, 400-350BC from Greece, 
NM64.163, NICHOLSON MUSEUM, UNIV. OF SYDNEY. (Measurements: 
8.1x6.8cm).  Figure 2 is a bronze statue of a comic slave wearing characteris-
tic slave mask.  Made in Greece.  
Figure 2 
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Comic slaves were notorious liars,104 but, to elite eyes, they are 
merely an extreme example of the characteristics of the un-
trustworthy—women, beggars, and non-elite men—with wav-
ing arms, shrieking voice,105 disordered clothing, contorted fac-
es, and backs bent from blows.106 
Conventional markers of fear or servitude are fatal to cred-
ibility.107  Quintilian advises that shortening the neck gives a 
look of servility, flattery, admiration, and fear.108  Modern ad-
vice warns, “[h]unched shoulders say ‘I am insecure and I feel 
defeated. I am weak.’”109  As a result, “your head will jut for-
ward as if it is about to drop off, the courtroom dog will growl 
at you.”110  Any gesture that signals protection of the genitals 
 
104.  Slaves were considered understandably prone to lying.  This com-
monplace informs Quintilian’s remark that lying, “which is at times repre-
hensible even in slaves, may on other occasions be praiseworthy even in a 
wise man.”  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XII.i.39. 
105.  For women’s speech as seductive, untruthful, and shaped by the 
female body and necessities of the womb with its related hysteria, see gener-
ally Lesley Dean-Jones, The Cultural Construct of the Female Body in Classi-
cal Greek Science, in SEX AND DIFFERENCE IN ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 192-
97 (Mark Golden & Peter Toohey eds., 2003); Joy Connolly, Mastering Cor-
ruption: Constructions of Identity in Roman Oratory, in WOMEN AND SLAVES 
IN GRECO-ROMAN CULTURE (Sandra R. Joshel & Sheila Murnaghan eds., 
1998); Nancy Demand, Women and Slaves as Hippocratic Patients, in WOMEN 
AND SLAVES IN GRECO-ROMAN CULTURE 56 (Sandra R. Joshel & Sheila Murna-
ghan eds., 1998); Ann Bergren, Language and the Female in Early Greek 
Thought, 16 ARETHUSA 69 (1983).  
106.  Sitting, particularly upon the ground, was characteristic of beggars 
and slaves.  See Bremmer, supra note 73, at 25.  Slaves and beggars listen 
and speak from need, motivated by hunger and fear so that they say what 
will please, rather than what is true.  See, e.g., HOMER, ODYSSEY 14.122-132 
(Richard Lattimore trans., 1967); O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 61-63. 
107.  “The determination of credibility (conversely deception) often is 
read in the facial expression of fear.”  Michael Searcy et al., Communication 
in the Courtroom and the “Appearance” of Justice, in APPLICATIONS OF 
NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 53 (Ronald E. Riggio & Robert S. Feldman eds., 
2005).  The authors link this to the contemporary concept of leakage and 
“fear of getting caught,” yet “in the absence of an acute conscious or obvious 
sense of guilt about lying, using NVC [nonverbal communication] alone to de-
termine witness credibility is difficult.”  Id. 
108.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.83.  
109.  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 58.  SONYA HAMLIN, WHAT 
MAKES JURIES LISTEN TODAY 211 (1998), identifies round shoulders as “weak 
and insecure . . . [giving an] air of incompetence and self-doubt.”  
110.  BALL, supra note 76, at 5.  
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is, not surprisingly, even more taboo.  “The lawyer should nev-
er grasp [his] hands together in front of the crotch area or be-
hind.”111  “It is a weak, insecure position that makes a man 
seem unsure of himself no matter how comfortable it may 
feel.”112  By extension, this applies to women, too: “[t]he same 
thing happens [telegraphing fear] when women ‘comfortably’ 
fold their arms in front of their breasts.”113  Self-protecting vul-
nerable areas of the body undermines the argument because 
fear and weakness menace the commitment to truth.114 
Disordered movement and a high voice are also fatal.115  
The weak must hurry, driven on by fear or irrational emotion 
of various sorts.116  “Exuberant gesticulation and movement 
were characteristic of slaves; a free man does not run, but the 
running slave was a stock type.”117  Of course, slaves run be-
cause they must at the bidding of others, but there is more at 





111.  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 57. 
112.  BALL, supra note 76, at 6.  “Until the trial advocate is sure of him-
self and his technique, it is better to make gestures above the waist level. 
Gestures made below the waist tend to suggest suppression or debasement 
and are more difficult to perform for beginners.”  Persons, supra note 78, at 
60. 
113.  BALL, supra note 76, at 6. 
114.  “Arms crossed in front of the chest is a clear sign that the per-
son . . . feels that they have to protect themselves against further interroga-
tion.  Legs crossed can also look defensive and closed.  Clenched fists or 
hands gripping the arms show tension and an underlying anxiety about the 
situation.  Hand-wringing reveals an even greater feeling of anxiety.”  2 
JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 15.13 [hereinafter JURYWORK]. 
115.  CORBEILL, supra note 73, at 133. 
116.  See QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.112; Graf, supra note 54, at 
49.  Pictures on attic vases confirm that individually waving arms is a sign of 
both excessive emotion and of fear; the latter, not surprisingly, is also repre-
sented through running.  These gestures belong to women, children, old men, 
and barbarians.  See generally, Timothy, J. McNiven, Behaving Like an Oth-
er: Telltale Gestures in Athenian Vase Painting, in NOT THE CLASSICAL IDEAL 
(Beth Cohen ed., 2005).   
117.  “[B]ut other violent gestures belong either to slaves or to low class 
free-born: shaking the head in anger or being swollen with it; grinding one’s 
teeth and slapping the thigh in anger.”  Graf, supra note 54, at 49. 
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Move about the courtroom very slowly and delib-
erately. It is important to remember that too 
many advocates move with undue haste in court. 
Slower movements with feet moving from place 
to place and gestures with hands and arms cue to 
audience members that I am in control of this 
situation.118 
 
A similar problem of control and fear underlies the re-
quirement that the voice be low.119 Ancient audiences were felt 
to look upon a low voice as “a sign of courage, a high voice as a 
sign of cowardice.”120 Likewise, “[h]igher pitch, in American 
culture and American legal culture, is associated with lack of 
authority and demeaned as overly emotional.”121 Of course, a 
female speaker has a particular problem with this requirement 
and the underlying paradigm.  Thus, “[i]f you have a naturally 
high pitched voice, remember to speak slowly and try to lower 
the pitch.”122 
 
118.  84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 71.  “Too much movement by 
a trial lawyer can be disastrous for an opening statement or closing argu-
ment, because it makes the jurors nervous, and it signals the lawyer’s lack of 
confidence.”  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 59. 
119.  A low voice communicates power.  Bernstein, supra note 70, at 65.  
Quintilian distinguishes the exercise of an orator’s voice from that of a singer 
by comparing the training of the voice to that of a soldier who must march, 
carry burdens, mount guard, etc.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.26. 
120.  GLEASON, supra note 54, at 83 (citation omitted). 
121.  Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Peda-
gogy Contributes to the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. 
L. REV. 7, 49-50, 57 n.206 (1998) (citation omitted). 
122.  DIANA V. PRATT, LEGAL WRITING: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 329 (2d 
ed. 1993), cited by Stanchi, supra note 121, at 49 n.206.  “Sharp exclamation 
injures the voice and likewise jars the hearer, for it has about it something 
ignoble, suited rather to feminine outcry than to manly dignity in speaking.”  
AD HERENNIUM, supra note 20, at III.xii.22.  Emotion and an emotional style 
are feminine and contrary to nature.  The author recommends a low voice for 
debate.  Id. at III.xiv.25.  Similarly, “the speaker needs to realize that the 
best visual and aural qualities do not call attention to themselves.”  72 AM. 
JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 14.  The best aural quality is “a rich bari-
tone voice.”  Id. §18.  The writer is a woman, which illustrates how these 
norms transcend gender boundaries.  The prejudice against shrill voices is 
certainly alive:  
 
Who trusts a shrill-voiced trial lawyer? Who has great con-
fidence in a monotone voice, or a breathy voice, or a voice 
25
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Failures of delivery, social status, and self-control are in-
distinguishable in the dominant elite paradigm. “A man’s lack 
of sexual self-control reveals itself in his speech: the inconti-
nent man has a high-pitched voice.”123  Presumably his lack of 
control assimilates him to the feminine.  Running and move-
ment in general become evidence that “low origin and lack of 
self-control obviously go[] together.”124  Too much gesture signi-
fies too little reason; even neutral automatic or repetitive ges-
tures represent slippage of mental control.  A modern writer 
points out: “A senseless bobbing of the head sends a senseless 
subtext.”125  Quintilian makes the point more strongly: “Even 
the frequent nodding of the head is not free from fault, while to 
toss or roll it till our hair flies free is suggestive of a fanatic.”126 
Gestures that seem to respond to bodily, not mental, impera-
tives are conceptualized as even more revealing: 
 
[T]rial lawyers need to re-think their delivery 
patterns, and most advocates need to learn new 
muscle memory that will allow them a narrow 
range of acceptable gestures. No longer should  
 
with a lisp, or with an irritating high-pitch, or awkward 
pausing or added useless sounds (uhh, umm, er)? If we do 
not give full credibility to individuals outside the courtroom 
with these vocal qualities, we certainly will not give credi-
bility to problem-voiced lawyers inside the courtroom, a 
place held in awe by jurors.  
81 AM. JUR. TRIALS 317 The Trial Lawyer’s Persuasive Speaking Voice § 1 
(2016).  See SAYLER & SHADEL, supra note 16, at 119-20, 124-26 (discussing 
the problems of pitch and emotion in women). 
123.  GLEASON, supra note 54, at 83 (footnote omitted).  Ekman points 
out that in the 1930s, expansive gesticulation was considered characteristic 
of “‘inferior races,’ such as the Jews or gypsies, [who] made many large, 
sweeping illustrators compared to the ‘superior,’ less gesturally expansive 
Aryans.”  Ekman, supra note 32, at 105.  Likewise, “[s]tereotyping by role 
and exaggerated speech and gestures is commonplace and consistent with 
images of Blacks historically relied upon by the mass media.”  Desiree A. 
Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The Impact of Advertising on 
Race, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615, 654 (2000). 
124.  Graf, supra note 54, at 49. 
125.  JULIUS FAST, BODY LANGUAGE IN THE WORK PLACE 65 (1994); HAMLIN, 
supra note 109, at 209 (stating that “any gestural habit will, after a time, 
look false”).  See also People v. Bellucci, No. H023624, 2003 WL 756829, at 
*2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2003). 
126.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.71.  
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they wave their hands and arms about led by 
whim and the subconscious muscle guidance sys-
tem. No longer should they stamp about the 
courtroom or slouch in their chairs. No longer 
should they scratch127 or let their hands fly free. 
Jurors are watching everything.128 
 
Gestures outside the elite range are identified as creatures 
of individual “whim” and sub-rational “subconscious muscle 
guidance” that show that the body, not the mind, is in charge. 
Seeing them, the watching jurors assume the worst: irrational-
ity and deception. 
 
III. POPULAR NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION: 
ADOPTING AN ALTERNATE PERSUASIVE BODY 
 
A. Rejection by the Dominant Elite Tradition 
As this section will show, the elite speaker has a potent ri-
val in the rhetorical tradition: the popular speaker.  The popu-
lar speaker reverses elite norms to forge a bond with the audi-
ence and establish an alternative basis for trust, the invocation 
of shared, non-elite experience. Instead of restrained elite de-
meanor, he adopts expansive gestures, raised voice, increased 
movement, informal posture, and informal, rumpled, or dishev-
eled clothing.  Such delivery is associated with trials, with chal-
lenges to the established order (charging it with deceit or fail-
ure), and with defense attorneys.  The dominant elite tradition, 
which includes almost all surviving classical works and most 
modern writers, condemns popular delivery, even while admit-
ting its power and the necessity.129  Thus, the rules and reasons 
for popular delivery appear only indirectly in ancient sources.  
 
127.  See Appendix.  
128.  84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 7 also prohibits pinching or 
wiping one’s nose, ear scratching, etc. as clues to “imputation of character” by 
the jury.  See also HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 209. 
129.  The impact of elite ideology on the accounts of popular rhetoric has 
long been recognized and plays out in the ancient and modern debates over 
the actual accomplishments of Cleon, the democratic leader.  See, e.g., A.G. 
Woodhead, Thucydides’ Portrait of Cleon, 13 MNEMEOSYNE 289, 290-91 (1960).  
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Modern sources can be more open to such non-verbal communi-
cation, but remain firmly anchored in the ancient popular/elite 
dichotomy and its terms.  Although popular delivery may be a 
rhetorical strategy,130 the tradition insists that, fundamentally, 
such non-verbal communication should be avoided and can be 
salvaged only when it is a conscious choice by a pedigreed elite 
speaker in limited circumstances.  Speakers who routinely em-
ploy popular delivery, and who are already non-elite speakers, 
are emphatically positioned on the wrong side of the traditional 
mind/body duality and, thus, destructive of society and jus-
tice.131 
The terms of rejection of popular non-verbal communica-
tion are rooted in power struggles over democracy: the bitterly 
contested changes as political power was exercised—or taken—
by lower social classes.  The poster boy for everything seen as 
wrong with this process, tools, and result was Cleon, the first 
demagogue, or populist, politician in democratic Athens, who 
secured his power and that of his supporters through new 
forms of political appeal, including a very different, and vastly 
effective, rhetoric.132  His opponents never tired of painting Cle-
 
130.  Charges of using popular delivery are political weapons that posi-
tion an opponent on the wrong side of the body/mind duality, not identifica-
tions of ways of speaking.  Thus, for example, Cicero both attacked others as 
popular speakers and was himself similarly attacked through criticism of de-
livery and style.  See CORBEILL, supra note 73, at 128.  For debate explicitly 
rooted in classical sources and reflecting many of the assumptions discussed 
here over elite rhetoric, as opposed to the “middling,” or more popular rheto-
ric used by Lincoln and Henry Ward Beecher before the Civil War, see 
WINTERER, supra note 15, at 70-74. 
131.  The elite appropriation of rationality is also reflected in the rules of 
evidence, which allows a judge, usually an elite figure, to decide if something 
is too emotional for the jury and will overwhelm its, presumably more fragile, 
reason.  See FED. R. EVID. 403.  “[T]he oldest, and still dominant, set of as-
sumptions [is] the “classical” view.  Those who subscribe to this viewpoint see 
emotions as dangerous forces that are likely to corrupt the fact-finding pro-
cess by displacing the role of cool, unemotional reason.”  Mark Spottswood, 
Emotional Fact-Finding, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 41 (2014).  “Evidentiary rules 
and practices reveal a folk psychological view of emotion, placing it at odds 
with reason.”  Teneille R. Brown, The Affective Blindness of Evidence Law, 89 
DENV. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (2011).  However, the folk tradition is a manifestation 
of classical struggle rhetoric and political power.  
132.  Cleon was “the master of a new technology of political power.”  
O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 9 (footnote omitted).  See, e.g., W. ROBERT 
CONNOR, NEW POLITICIANS OF FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS 116, 119 (1971).  Cle-
on’s delivery mirrored his other rhetorical innovations.   
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on as a corrupt social inferior, working to maximize his own 
gain and that of the mob who were his supporters.133  In this 
picture, Pericles led Athens to glory by uniting the citizens; 
Cleon destroyed Athens by dividing them.  Pericles was an ex-
cellent general; Cleon stole his victories from others.134  And, 
above all, Pericles rose above the body and told the truth, how-
ever unpalatable; Cleon was mired in the body and devoted to 
lies.135 
A primary point of attack was Cleon’s methods of non-
verbal communication, which embodied his profound break 
with the traditional ruling elite.  Pericles’ unemotional re-
straint and bodily immobility, claiming rationality and univer-
sal truth, have been discussed above.  Cleon’s trademarks were 
shouting, vigorous movement, lower-class gestures like slap-
ping the thigh, and disordering his clothing, all of which con-
tributed to his emotional appeals.136  His techniques empha-
sized his solidarity with the ordinary citizens who could not 
forget the requirements and vulnerabilities of the body.137  His 
delivery, like his political success, visibly relocated power from 
elite speaker to the mass of listeners, assembled as political or 
legal decision makers.138 Elite writers associated this relocation  
 
133.  See, e.g., ARISTOPHANES, THE KNIGHTS, 40-60 (Loeb Classical Li-
brary) (Benjamin B. Rogers trans., 1924), in which Cleon is represented as a 
slave corrupting his master, Demos, with food.  See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF 
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 3.36.6 (Rex Warner, trans. 1972), in which Cleon is 
identified as the most violent of the citizens and the most persuasive. 
134.  See, e.g., ARISTOPHANES, supra note 133, at 1-55.  The opening sce-
ne represents Nicias and Demosthenes, two Athenian generals, claiming that 
Paphlagon, the Cleon character, has lied and claimed credit for their victo-
ries; the slaves consider running away (that is, deserting) as a result.  Id. at 
20-30. 
135.  For Thucydides’ contrast of Pericles and Cleon, see HARRY YUNIS, 
TAMING DEMOCRACY, 59-86 (1996).  Modern historians differ on factual accu-
racy of these ancient accounts; however, that does not alter their impact as 
ideological positions.  See MARTIN OSTWALD, FROM POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY TO 
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW: LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN FIFTH-CENTURY 
ATHENS 202 (1986). 
136.  For Cleon’s yelling, see ARISTOPHANES, supra note 133, at 135-36; 
PLUTARCH, NICIAS VIII.3 (Loeb Classical Library) (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 
1967).  Cleon is accused of first using used licentiousness and buffoonery to 
delight the Athenians.  PLUTARCH, NICIAS III.1, VIII.3. 
137.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, §1359b.  
138.  PLATO, GORGIAS § 456, supra note 127; O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 
12. 
29
 408 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
 
of power with a menace to truth.  Deprived of its individual 
guarantor, that is, the elite speaker, truth is threatened by 
mob violence.  For the elite tradition, Cleon’s body language re-
flected not a different understanding of how to arrive at deci-
sions, but a failure of character, his and his audience’s.139  Both 
speaker and audience were characterized as closer to slaves 
and women than rational men.140  Such “persuasion” relied not 
on truth and reason, but need and satisfaction.141  Within this 
paradigm, it was not surprising that Cleon is conceptualized as 
initiating the destruction of the arena for rational discourse 
and, thus, the destruction of Athens.142 
The remarkable stability of both forms of popular delivery 
and their evaluation within the elite rhetorical paradigm is ev-
idenced in rhetorical “history.”  The first Roman politician to 
appeal directly to the mass of the citizens was, like Cleon, no-
table “both for the vehemence of his speech and his comple-
mentary innovations in delivery: he was the first to pull his to-
ga aside to free his left arm for gesture, the first to pace along 
the Rostra.”143  His successor, another (in)famous popular 
speaker, is credited with introducing the famous thigh slap to 
Roman oratory.144  The account proceeds with the typical elite 
characterization of popular delivery, as nature, not skill, and 
 
139.  This trend begins in Thucydides and Aristophanes and continues 
in influential assessments of the period.  For the opposition between Pericles 
and those who followed, first of all Cleon, in terms of character, see 
PLUTARCH, PERICLES, supra note 59, at XXXIX; NICIAS, supra note 135, at III. 
140.  See e.g., ARISTOPHANES, supra note 133, passim.  The play repre-
sents Cleon as a slave who is finally outdone by an even more degraded per-
son, a sausage seller who can cater even better to his master’s stomach.  Id.  
141.  Sophistic, popular speakers like Cleon were mocked as speak-
ing/farting through their assholes, an image that continues today.  O’REGAN, 
supra note 40, at 59. 
142.  Id. at 9-11. 
143.  ROBERT MORSTEIN-MARX, MASS ORATORY AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
LATE REPUBLICAN ROME 271 (2004) (discusses the more expansive delivery of 
popular speakers appealing to the masses).  See also Elaine Fantham, Quin-
tilian on Performance: Traditional and Personal Elements in “Institutio” 11.3, 
36 PHOENIX 243 (1982).  The speaker is Caius Gracchus, who is explicitly 
compared to Cleon in PLUTARCH, TIBERIUS GRACCHUS II.2 in TIBERIUS & CAIUS 
GRACCHUS (Loeb Classical Library) (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1921). 
144.  See Fantham, supra note 143, at 259 (discussing the ancient 
sources of this lore). 
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mingles belly and speech, discussing table manners, diction, 
character, temper, tone, and, finally, vulnerability, flight, and 
death.145 
The contest between elite delivery, rationality, justice, and 
truth on the one hand, and popular delivery, irrationality, mob 
violence, and injustice on the other, animates one common un-
derstanding of trial.  It was first articulated in the most influ-
ential trial scene in our tradition: Plato’s account of Socrates’ 
trial and conviction.146  Socrates’ demeanor positions him firm-
ly on the positive side of the mind/body duality—and his prose-
cutors and the jury on the other.  He dies because he rejected 
“effrontery and impudence and . . . refused to address [the ju-
rors] in the way which would give [them] most pleas-
ure . . . doing or saying all sorts of things.”147  He ignores the 
jurors’ ordinary concerns, fear, favor, and even death, and cares 
only for public good.148  He refuses to appeal to the jurors’ emo-
tions, to make “passionate appeals,” or to “stage[] pathetic 
scenes” that would reduce justice to a personal favor, rather 
than transcendent value.149  The speech that would have wooed 
the jury would be the speech of a slave or women150 shaped by 
physical vulnerability and, thus, deceptive and inconstant.  In-
stead, Socrates’ truthfulness and his physical and emotional 
immobility are one: having taken his stand, he will not budge, 
a claim explicitly compared to his unyielding stance in battle.151  
The moving image of a lone, immobile man, associated with ra-
tional truth, and his hyperactive, irrational persecutors, sus-
tains elite rhetoric and its trademark delivery as the only mor-
ally viable option.  It naturalizes elite delivery, and all of its 
class-related claims, as virtue, and discredits democratic rheto-
ric along with the jury, a much-contested innovation of demo-
 
145.  PLUTARCH, TIBERIUS GRACCHUS supra note 143, at II.2-5; CAIUS 
GRACCHUS, supra note 142, at XVII. 
146.  “A typological smear that tied unmoderated democracy to unreason 
was planted by Plato in the representation of Socrates’ condemnation by a 
people’s court.”  John Henderson, The Runabout: A Volume Retrospect, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE GUIDE TO ANCIENT RHETORIC 282 (Erik Gunderson ed., 2009). 
147.  PLATO, supra note 25, § 38d-e.  See also § 28b, 34c.   
148.  Id. § 22e-23b, 25c, 30d. 
149.  Id. § 37a , 35b-c. 
150.  Id. § 35b, 38e. 
151.  Id. § 28d-e, 38e. 
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cratic Athens.  Plato’s undisputed rhetorical mastery positions 
elite strategy as rejection of rhetoric and the “natural” truth-
fulness of authentic men. 
 
B. Embracing Other Demeanors for Persuasion and 
Alternative Truths 
However, popular delivery’s power, particularly when ar-
guing the “weaker” side, that is, arguing against the estab-
lished/political social classes and state or institutional struc-
tures,152 was, and is, unarguable.  Without abandoning the link 
between character and delivery, rhetorical advice also recog-
nizes popular delivery as a strategy—risky, but sometimes nec-
essary, and particularly suited to jury trial or other venues in 
which the audience is conceptualized as non-elite and, thus, po-
tentially less rational.153  For example, after recommending 
elite demeanor, the authors of Trial Communication Skills 




152.  In Rome, non-elite delivery signified “‘breaking of ranks,’ taking up 
a position just a bit, but significantly, askew of the ‘suits’ of the senatorial or-
der.”  MORSTEIN-MARX, supra note 143, at 273 (footnote omitted).  Adoption of 
trademark gestures of non-elite delivery sent a clear message.  “By not avoid-
ing behavior specifically marked in his society as feminine, Caesar could be 
perceived as transgressing normal modes of male, aristocratic behavior. In 
violating the accepted relationship between appearance and reality, Caesar 
fashions himself as a proponent of political change.”  CORBEILL, supra note 
73, at 137.  Rideout discusses how different persona and voice are in a Su-
preme Court dissent than in a majority opinion.  Yet, as he observes, only 
those of impeccable elite legal standing, Supreme Court Justices, can deviate 
successfully from the standard legal voice; others, he implies, would be 
charged with irrationality and failure of disciplined legal self.  Rideout, supra 
note 49, at 103-04.  
153.  Wetlaufer points out that “good lawyers, good judges are attentive 
to a range of persuasive possibilities broader than that here identified as the 
discipline-specific rhetoric of law” and identifies this broader range with 
“passion,” ties this to the “rhetoric of politics,” and associates it with “speech 
to his jury under circumstances where such a speech may be useful or neces-
sary.”  Wetlaufer, supra note 6, at 1562-63.  “In speaking to this jury, the 
good judge, like the effective trial lawyer, will depart from the customary 
rhetoric of law.”  Id.  Thus, he ties his analysis of legal rhetoric to the ancient 
dichotomy of elite reason and popular irrationality while also, in a traditional 
move, justifying it as strategy if undertaken by an elite figure.  See also id. at 
1596. 
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In the late 1960s, clients of William Kunstler did 
not expect him to behave like a typical estab-
lishment lawyer. They wanted him to make a 
personal if flamboyant statement to flout what 
they felt was improperly exercised authority. A 
young lawyer from Marin County, California told 
the authors that she once dared to go into court 
in jeans . . . . It was the jury I wanted to reach. 
They were all young, most of them counter-
culture types, and I knew they’d react negatively 
to a suit or even a dress. I know the jeans swung 
the case in my favor. This kind of approach 
would be ridiculous in most areas, but, again, it 
was a case of her projecting an image with which 
the jury could identify.154 
 
Her delivery is a choice, not a character trait.  These highly 
skilled attorneys manipulate the repertoire of popular delivery 
in gesture, dress, and voice to build persuasion and support the 
argument they are using. 
The observation that non-verbal communication can take 
various forms as needed is profoundly risky for the elite para-
digm and the legal system it supports.  The practical considera-
tions mask deeper, contested philosophies about the origin and 
status of truth. Embedded in the notion of choice among strat-
egies is an assessment of speech quite at odds with the elite 
universalizing linkage of one delivery, one credibility, one ra-
tionality, and one truth. Rooting communication in persuasion 
to which all are subject, and tying delivery to that paradigm, 
challenges all these notions.155  The clash of perspectives is an-
cient: Plato and Aristotle report that delivery, as a topic, was 
first associated with the sophists,156 notorious believers in the 
relativity or unavailability of truth and the unfettered force of 
 
154.  ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 4.08.  
155.  This may be echoed in the “agonizing simplistic” debate over 
whether decision making by judges and juries should involve suppression of 
emotion.  Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 
1944, 1945 (2012).  See Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of 
Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629, 630, 633-41 (2011).  
156.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, § 1404a, links delivery’s importance to 
the sophists, beginning with Thrasymachus. 
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persuasion in the human world.157  Modern proponents of popu-
lar delivery agree: “Persuasion is the purpose of trial communi-
cation.”158  “Since advocacy uses persuasion rather than direct 
physical force, . . . the other party . . . must be led to want to do 
what the advocate is seeking.”159 
Popular expansive gesticulation and non-elite vocal tones 
aim at providing an alternative mechanism of credibility, 
shared experience and a claim of affiliation.  Modern popular 
practice replicates ancient patterns.160  Within the popular  
 
157.  The sophists, teachers of rhetoric to all in the newly democratic 
Athens, based persuasion on a notion of relative truth.  The elite linkage of 
delivery, the sophists, the body, self-interest, the masses, and multiple, mor-
tal truths form the opposite pole to elite claims to unitary, transcendent 
truth, accessible to a few.  See G.B. KERFERD, THE SOPHISTIC MOVEMENT 83-
110 (1981); WILLIAM GUTHRIE, THE SOPHISTS 176-225 (1971).  The notion of 
strategic choice as the basis for persuasion is embedded in kairos or speech 
appropriate for the moment, a trademark innovation.  See GUTHRIE, supra 
note 157, at 272. 
158.  However, the writer continues to relink persuasion and justice as 
most effective: “In order to be able to persuade, the trial attorney must be 
personally convinced that he or she is fulfilling a mission, the role of the ad-
vocate in achieving justice.  It is the advocate’s duty to perform this mission 
with conscience because advocacy without conscience is like a body without a 
soul.”  ARON ET AL., supra note 90, at 1-26.  See below on the role of the soul 
here. 
159.  RICHARD A. GIVENS, ADVOCACY: THE ART OF PLEADING A CAUSE 
§ 1.03, Supplement Appendix 16-2, § 10 (3d ed., 1992).  The concept is an-
cient.  Sophists imagined persuasion as a form of force to advertising the im-
portance of their instruction in persuasive speaking in democratic institu-
tions.  See O’REGAN, supra note 40, at 11-21.  Givens also focuses on the 
concept of alignment as the persuasive strategy: 
 
Witnesses, advocates, political figures, and sales personnel 
succeed and are sometimes convincing despite obvious clues 
indicating that they are dishonest, because the audience 
wants to believe them. An effective witness or advocate 
must accordingly seek to align their presentation with the 
interests of the tribunal to the extent feasible. Honesty, 
while in itself an advantage . . . must be combined with ef-
fective presentation and alignment with the anticipated re-
action of those who are to act on the basis of the presenta-
tion. 
GIVENS, supra note 159, at Supplement § 2.02.  Note the nod toward honesty 
as a rhetorical advantage. 
160.  See MORSTEIN-MARX, supra note 143, at 272-73 (noting that Cicero 
records that the Roman populace loved the name, speech, face and gait of the 
popular orators).  
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paradigm of non-verbal communication, the central question is 
“will you be recognizable to the jurors as human, like them?  As 
you proceed logically, in cool control, . . . can you also come 
across as a feeling and fallible human being?”161  “For jurors to 
relate to you, you must show them you know about all of life – 
as they do – not just an isolated, powerful, unfamiliar corner 
[the legal profession].”162  Thus, popular delivery embraces 
many alternatives and parades different bodies, explicitly ref-
erencing age, sex, class, race, and other markers of non-elite af-
filiation.  “To increase the momentum of the similarity princi-
ple, clothing choices, word usage, and behaviors should be 
similar to those of the jurors to a certain extent. . . . The goal is 
to create perceived homophyly (perceived similarity) between 
counsel, client, and jurors.”163 
Popular rhetoric in approach, and particularly in delivery, 
embraces a multifaceted notion of human life.  The reversal 
from the rules of elite delivery could not be more clear.  As one 
writer advising popular delivery acknowledges: “movement in 
the courtroom is controversial” and restricted; frequently judg-
es require the attorney to stand in one place.164  Judges’ “rea-
sons why movement is restricted [are]: ‘more dignified’, ‘more 
serious,’ ‘not so distracting,’ ‘not too intimidating to witness-
es.’”165  The author emphatically rejects these with the claim 
that “[m]ovement is life.”166  “Is the lectern and all it connotes a 
more reassuring image for the jury to focus on than a human 
being? . . . Does this give the client the best chance for his law-
yers to be at the top of their form?”167  Popular delivery, with 
 
161.  HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 9.  Note the attempt to fuse the under-
lying claim of elite rhetoric with popular strategies. 
162.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
163.  SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 15.  The authors work along 
a credibility/authority versus approachability/likeability/similarity axis, with 
advice about how to become more approachable that includes things like less 
formal attire.  Id. at 57-64 (with checklists).  Similarity to the jury is also im-
portant.  Id. at 177. 
164.  HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 215-16 (emphasis omitted). 
165.  Id. at 216. 
166.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
167.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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its gestures,168 movement, voice,169 and clothes,170 showcases 
“life.”  This experience shared with the audience underlies its 
credibility.171 
 
C. Rational Citizens and Irrational Mobs: Elite 
Charges of Pandering 
The “life” or common experiences that found the appeal of 
popular delivery are read by the elite tradition as particular-
ized, bodily, and, thus, irrational and self-interested.  While the 
notion of strategy may be used to root the popular speaker’s ac-
tions in rationality, no such mechanism salvages the audience.  
From the beginning of the elite tradition, attention to delivery 
– which means any non-verbal communication style except 
elite delivery—is linked to awakening emotions and, thus, to 
irrationality and corruption of the audience.172  Effective popu-
lar speech is explained by a formulaic charge of pandering, ac-
complishing its goals by indicating “aspects of the situation 
which will make it in the other party’s interest to do what the 
advocate wants to see done.”173  The elite view has sunk deep 
 
168.  Gesture must be added if not present, but it should appear natural.  
Hamlin recommends exercises to discover natural gestures that can be culti-
vated.  Id. at 745-46.  Likeability is promoted by gestures with the palm up.  
SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 76. 
169.  Voice, loudness, and accent are all important in establishing credi-
bility with a popular audience.  Loudness is more credible in jury trials.  
SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 137, 305. 
170.  Trial manuals give much advice on clothes.  Critical for popular 
delivery is the advice “[d]on’t emphasize your differences from them [jurors].”  
HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 239.  Unbuttoning the suit jacket has been identi-
fied as a “rewarding” behavior that will increase jury good will.  SMITH & 
MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 74.  The same types of advice are given for read-
ing jurors’ clothes.  See Herald Price Fahringer, “Mirror, Mirror on the 
Wall. . .”: Body Language, Intuition, and the Art of Jury Selection, 17 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 197, 200 (1993).  Dress and mind are taken as potentially 
equivalent: “Clothes slapped together in a vulgar, helter-skelter fashion may 
indicate careless analysis.”  Id. 
171.  Studies rating speakers with and without gestures have indicated 
that a person who wishes to be perceived as clear should use few gestures, 
but a “person who wants to be positively perceived and appreciated for inter-
personal qualities . . . should adopt a speech style using an abundance of ges-
tures.”  B. Rimé & L. Schiaratura, Gesture and Speech, in FUNDAMENTALS OF 
NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR 239, 276 (R. S. Feldman & B. Rimé eds., 1991). 
172.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, §1404a.  
173.  GIVENS, supra note 159, § 1.03, Supplement Appendix 16-2, § 10.  
Regarding jurors’ interests:   
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into the popular imagination.  One professor has summed up 
her students’ views as: 
 
Juries are always swayed by irrational appeals, 
in part, because it is passions and animus and 
emotion to which the lawyers play in order to get 
their clients off or to win huge sums in tort 
claims or in some other, usually dubious, cause. 
Lawyers, the aristocrats, helping us to stand 
somewhat above the fray so that the law might 
have room to work? You’ve got to be kidding! 
Lawyers pander to the mob mentality, they don’t 
oppose it. That’s a pretty fair summary of how 
things tend to go.174 
 
Elite, non-verbal communication promises rationality in 
the speaker and promotes an answering rationality in the au-
dience.  “[I]f a lawyer’s looks are ‘correct,’ that lawyer will leave 
the jurors emancipated in a strange way, free to judge the case 
on other criteria.”175  In contrast, confronted by deviation from 
the elite norm, the jurors cease to concentrate on argument and 
instead concentrate on the speakers: “his nose hairs, . . . his 
dandruff, or his confusing red tie, or her fuzzy hair, or her 
knees, or her dangling earrings.”176  While the jurors could be 
simply distracted, the terms of their distraction are revealing.  
 
 
[t]he trial lawyer should . . . ask[] “Which needs are the 
most crucial to jurors?” For example, counsel might ask, do 
the jurors seem motivated by the need for security? Then 
counsel will try relating his or her appeal to the jurors to 
their desire for safety. Another technique is to try coupling 
lesser needs to a great need, for researchers say that “bun-
dled needs” have more success. For example, bundling the 
need for safety with the need for self-respect might be effec-
tive. 
72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 65.  “[I]f you can tap into the jury’s 
self-interest you create an attentive, willing, thoughtful audience – motivated 
to listen.”  HAMLIN, supra note 109, at 22. 
174.  Jean Bethke Elshtain, Law and the Moral Life, 11 YALE J. L. & 
HUMAN. 383, 389 (1999). 
175.  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 44.  
176.  Id. 
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The speakers who are within the elite norm disappear; they 
leave behind what looks like disembodied speech.  However, 
speakers who transgress the norm, particularly in ways clearly 
identifiable as popular—excessive and personal costume or in-
trusive bodies—have the opposite effect.  Words and content 
disappear, foregrounding, instead, the improper body of a par-
ticular individual.  The association of low class, emotional ap-
peals, and irrationality appears in familiar advice about how to 
speak to various social groups.  “The nature of the summation 
is based on the intensity of the emotional impact to be conveyed 
to the particular jury type that you are facing.  A conservative 
upper class jury will not be persuaded by a summation loaded 
with emotional impact.  On the other hand, a blue-collar-type 
jury is more likely to react favorably toward an emotional 
summation . . . .”177 
The ancient cultural narrative that listeners may flip from 
rational “good juror” to irrational “bad juror” under the pres-
sure of non-elite persuasive strategy provides the underpin-
nings for the changing evaluations of jurors that Leubsdorf has 
shown justify the Rules of Evidence.178  Assumptions built into 
our legal tradition, including the mutually exclusive nature of 
rationality and emotion, along with an ideological division of 
reason and emotion between judge (and the elite in general) 
 
177.  SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 755.  Similarly, judges are 
associated with rationality and juries with bodily emotionality.  “For exam-
ple, in bench trials, the target is the head of the fact-finder; in jury trials, the 
heart of each juror is the mark.”  ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 19.02.  “I have 
seen some lawyers who think it is effective to pander to emotion. I think this 
is a mistake in a jury trial, but it is particularly dangerous in a court trial.”  
Robert E. Cartwright, Jr., “Bench Trial Acumen”—To Bench or Not To 
Bench—That is the Question, Address Before Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America Winter Convention (2004), in WINTER 2004 ATLA-CLE 93, at 6.  
Yet there is little evidence that judges actually disregard emotion more readi-
ly than juries.  Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About 
How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 27 (1997). 
178.  The phrases “good juror” and “bad juror” are from Leubsdorf, supra 
note 7, at 1248.  The elite tradition’s successful framing of rhetorical choices 
as expressive of rationality and irrationality in speaker and audience paral-
lels Leubsdorf’s third presupposition that “law is justified by ambivalent and 
contrary distinctions between reason and emotion, and between the strengths 
and weaknesses of jurors, distinctions that turn out to be based less on reali-
ty than on the structural requirements of trials.”  Id. at 1212.  “That struc-
ture gives certain roles to jurors and others to judges and then assigns them 
strengths and weaknesses appropriate to their roles.”  Id. at 1253.   
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and jury, or the non-elite,179 facilitate reduction of juries’ power 
and dismissal of disfavored jury verdicts as irrational, rather 
than competing truths, particularly when the case involves 
non-elite jurors,180 parties, or other participants.  The speaker 
is conceptualized as reaching his personal goals – usually iden-
tified as winning at all costs—through tactics that transform 
his audience.  “The explanation for [a] legally inexplicable deci-
sion lies in the defense’s ability to pander to the fears of the ju-
ry,”181 “to obtain a favorably biased jury, and if deemed neces-
sary, to suggest evidence and argumentation that panders to 
the basest emotions of the jurors.”182  This dispenses with 
“truth and justice.”183  The dichotomy, its justifications, and its 
consequences fall squarely within classical, elite paradigm of 
rhetoric. 
 
IV. VENUES OF ELITE ENFORCEMENT 
 
The extent to which elite delivery successfully occupies the 
positive pole of traditional dualities—nature, not art; mind, not 
body; universal, not particular; and finally, virtuous, not vi-
cious—justifies and perpetuates a regime of inculcation and 
discipline in legal institutions. 
 
179.  Mark Spottswood, Emotional Fact-Finding, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 41, 
42 (2014) (citations omitted).  He collects citations illustrating that the di-
chotomy is duplicated in the scholarly literature on trial and evidence.  Id. at 
46-57.  He also traces the negative view of emotions back to Aristotle.  Id. at 
47.  See Brown, supra note 131, at 60-61 (summarizing the history of the as-
sociation of reason with judges). 
180.  Similarly, as juries changed from exclusively “reasonable men” to 
include traditionally marginalized racial and ethnic groups and women, they 
were perceived differently.  Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: 
The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 
336-41 (1995).  An increasing number of rules restricted their power and 
transferred it to the judge, typically a male member of the elite.  “Allowing 
the judge to define rationality, by giving him the ability to set aside jury ver-
dicts he considers irrational, implies that juries, like women, tend toward the 
irrational, and must constantly be monitored.”  Id. at 328 (citations omitted).  
181.  Aaron Goldstein, Note, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule of Law, 
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2003).  
182.  Franklin Strier, Paying the Piper: Proposed Reforms of the Increas-
ingly Bountiful but Controversial Profession of Trial Consulting, 44 S.D. L. 
REV. 699, 707 (1998-99). 
183.  “Trial consultants, however, are under no more constraint to seek 
truth and justice than are the attorneys they assist.”  Id. at 708. 
39
 418 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
 
A.  Acquiring the Language and the Elite Body of the 
Law: Law School 
Just as learning to think like a lawyer involves jettisoning 
languages of social class, ethnic origin, and so forth, learning to 
act like a lawyer involves jettisoning previous methods of non-
verbal communication.  This is part of our tradition.  Training 
in rhetoric was the backbone of education throughout the Ro-
man world.184  It promoted acquisition of mental and physical 
practices that were conceptually and practically standard, re-
gardless of the speaker’s origin.185  The rigorous course of study 
incorporated elite advantage, yet provided the primary vehicle 
for changes in status by those not part of the Roman elite.186  
Study of rhetoric “effected its own distinctive transformation of 
the student . . . [that] often entailed a permanent migration 
from one culture to another . . . and . . . encompassed attitudes, 
practices, and beliefs, indeed the student’s very sense of self” 
that made it “a process of acculturation.”187  All were required 
to undergo extensive, and often brutal, practice of their oral 
and reasoning skills before audiences of their peers and experi-
enced speakers; only a tiny fraction would ever use the skills in 
the courts.188  Further, the tradition’s strong assertion of the 
 
184.  HABINEK, supra note 14, at 60-61. 
185.  Id. at 67.  For an elite educational focus on physical deportment, 
see CORBEILL, supra note 73, at 124, who points out the connection with 
Bourdieu’s theory of habitus.  See also FROST, supra note 14, at 615-16. 
186.  CORBEILL, supra note 73, at 122, 123.  
187.  HABINEK, supra note 14, at 61.  Wetlaufer argues that “our particu-
lar rhetorical conventions and commitments . . . constitute our selves[sic], our 
communities, and, perhaps, our world. . . . Those commitments bear not just 
upon how we say the things we say but also upon what we say, on what we 
are able to see, on what we are able to think, on what we are able to know 
and believe, and on who we are able to be.”  Wetlaufer, supra note 6, at 1548 
(emphasis added).   
188.  “Rhetoric was the calisthenics of manhood.”  GLEASON, supra note 
54, at xxii.  For a discussion of the masculine rhetorical ideal, see 
GUNDERSON, supra note 54, at ch. 2; HABINEK, supra note 14, at 67; and Con-
nolly, supra note 105, at 134.  Thus, Quintilian starts with the training of a 
boy and ends with a man.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at I.pr. 5-8.  Gleason 
comments, “the art of self-presentation through rhetoric entailed much more 
than mastery of words: physical control of one’s voice, carriage, facial expres-
sion, and gesture, control of one’s emotions under conditions of competitive 
stress—in a word all the arts of deportment necessary.”  GLEASON, supra note 
54, at xxii. 
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connection between elite education, including delivery, and 
personal morality meant that training in the rules of non-
verbal persuasion was considered to train the character.189  
Conscious incarnation of the restrictions of elite delivery was a 
process assumed to fortify the mind with rational control over 
the body and passion.190  Departure from the elite model was 
remarked, ridiculed, and punished at every level of Roman edu-
cation and practice.191 
Acculturation explicitly continues as a model for law 
schools,192 where physical and mental remodeling of students 
occurs in tandem.  Within this paradigm, as shown above, the 
elite delivery of the warrior remains the norm.  Although for 
some students this elite demeanor is more foreign than for oth-
ers, its acquisition by all students is a primary focus of law 
school classrooms and skills training.  Students acquire a new 
set of mental and physical professional habits that seem mutu-
ally entailing.  Proper elite deportment is conceptualized as 
tightly linked with professional formation, with legal rationali-
ty, and with proper character—in fact, as one and the same.193 
 
189.  For the study of oratory as the study of virtue, see QUINTILIAN, su-
pra note 20, at I.pr. 12, 179; Catherine Atherton, Children, Animals, Slaves, 
and Grammar, in PEDAGOGY AND POWER: RHETORICS OF CLASSICAL LEARNING 
229-41 (Yun Lee Too & Niall Livingston eds., 1998) (discussing the Roman 
view of education, culminating in rhetoric, as moral training that, not sur-
prisingly, distinguished free citizens from slaves).  See also Teresa Morgan, 
Quintilian’s Political Theory, in PEDAGOGY AND POWER 249 (Yun Lee Too & 
Niall Livingston eds., 1998) (discussing Quintilian’s education of an orator as 
aimed at virtue).  
190.  See GLEASON, supra note 54, at 72; Connolly, supra note 105, at 
134; Gunderson, supra note 54, at 171-73.  
191.  Quintilian records persistent jokes passed down in the tradition at 
the expense of elite speakers who got carried away and ventured too far into 
the realm of unsanctioned popular delivery.  See, e.g., QUINTILIAN, supra note 
20, at XI.iii 126, 129.  
192.  “Training lawyers is a process of enculturation.”  Adam Babich, Es-
say on the Political Dimension of Clinics: The Apolitical Law School Clinic, 11 
CLINICAL L. REV. 447, 452 (2005).  “Integrating the narrow notion of ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’ is important for students as it initiates them into the world of 
the law in contemporary American society. It is, in essence (and for lack of a 
better term), an indoctrination into the world of adversarialism and advoca-
cy.”  David T. Butleritchie, Situating “Thinking like a Lawyer” within Legal 
Pedagogy, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 31 (2002-03). 
193.  The claim that law schools do not inculcate virtue to the extent de-
sired means that instruction in the law is conceived of as instruction in virtue 
and (re)formation of character.  “We convey and inculcate some variety of 
41
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Law schools celebrate remodeling students’ minds.  
“Learning to think like a lawyer” is a clear institutional goal.194  
The process, as Mertz and others have pointed out, pushes to 
the margins differences in “experience” and “actual structure of 
voices heard” that derive from “race, gender, class, or other as-
pects of social identity.”195  Students’ attention is reoriented to 
abstract, formalizing accounts that focus on questions of au-
thority and translate particular life-events into “a shared rhet-
oric, legal language that generates an appearance of neutrali-
ty.”196  The students are pushed to acquire a professional 
“voice.” The optimistic understanding of this process is that, 
through it, students join the legal discourse community.197  
 
moral and ethical sensibilities when we induce our students to take up legal 
thinking. We are always teaching more than law when we teach students to 
think like lawyers.”  James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second 
Thoughts, 47 MERCER L. REV. 511, 540 (1996).  A familiar role is assigned to 
clinical courses or skills activities: inculcating ethics “is done by having a 
lawyer living out the rules of ethics in the actual practice of law before stu-
dents’ eyes, and then insisting that those students live them out before hers.”  
Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What Duties Do We 
Owe to Our Students, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 786 (2004). 
194.  Like all acculturation, the process provides more than technical 
knowledge.  “Law school students not only learn to ‘think like lawyers’ in 
terms of analytical technique, but also begin to internalize the four core val-
ues that define the legal profession: (1) integrity, (2) competence, (3) respect 
for the rule of law, and (4) loyalty to clients.” Babich, supra note 192, at 452 
(citations omitted).  Thinking like a lawyer means abandoning ways of inter-
preting reality that involve social, gender, racial, cultural, or economic differ-
ences from the prevailing model.  See generally Stanchi, supra note 121; 
Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Processes and Resistance to 
In”Doctrine”ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary 
on Mertz’s Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000).  The student acquires the common sense and 
the common body of the lawyer, and they are mutually reinforcing.  See Rob-
ert Dingwall, Language, Law, and Power: Ethnomethodology, Conversation, 
Analysis, and the Politics of Law and Society Studies, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
885, 893 (2000). 
195.  Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal 
and Anthropological Translations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91, 112-13 (2000).  
See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL 211-12 (2007). 
196.  MERTZ, supra note 195, at 109.  For legal reading as a cultural 
product, see generally M.H. Hoeflich, The Lawyer as Pragmatic Reader: The 
History of Legal Common-Placing, 55 ARK. L. REV. 87 (2002). 
197.  “[O]ne purpose, at least, of legal academia is to empower law stu-
dents . . . to join the discourse community of law beyond law school.”  Susan 
L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of 
Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489, 491 n.13 (2002). 
42https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1
 2017 EYING THE BODY TO FIND TRUTH 421 
“[T]hrough subtle reframing of language structure and ideology 
imparted by their professors, [the students’] own voices shift, 
and as they undergo a reorientation towards spoken and writ-
ten language, they achieve new identities as lawyers.”198  The 
new orientation elides, and is intended to elide, their differ-
ences as they are molded to the common pattern.  A standard 
feature of classroom practice is, of course, testing these mental 
and rhetorical patterns orally before a professional audience. 
Learning to think like a lawyer is coupled with learning to 
act like one, that is, like an elite warrior.  Law colleges affirm 
in practice and pedagogy the surviving, ancient link between 
rationality and elite decorum, and, more covertly, between irra-
tionality and other forms of non-verbal communication.  The 
standard Socratic method in the first-year classes begins to in-
culcate elite posture and restraint.  From the first day, stu-
dents are expected to adopt a professional demeanor as they 
respond to often aggressive questioning unemotionally, fre-
quently standing, facing the professor, physically quiet, as they 
learn how to manipulate doctrine.  The method is justified as 
reproducing the courtroom.199  Physical training continues in 
 
198.  MERTZ, supra note 195, at 116.  Mertz also argues that “the Socrat-
ic method . . . may continue to linger because of a symbolic ‘fit’ between the 
form and function of language.”  Id. at 100.  Similarly, legal writing is concep-
tualized as reshaping the language and, thus, at least the professional, self of 
students “in teaching novice legal writers, we are not only teaching voice, but 
in that process we are also constructing a self—the self of a legal writer.”  
Rideout, supra note 49, at 67 (emphasis omitted). 
199.  Dingwall states: 
 
The classroom mimics the law court with a confrontation 
between students and teacher in which students are re-
quired to talk as if they were counsel and the teacher 
switches between responding like a difficult judge and giv-
ing a situated commentary on the adequacy of the students’ 
talk. Success occurs when students can do “being a lawyer,” 
talking through their point in the way that a practitioner 
would.  The public nature of this confrontation, often de-
scribed by students as humiliating, mimics the public ac-
countability of the courtroom.  This goes right down to the 
listening demanded of other students, who may be called on 
without notice to take up the point, which anticipates the 
listening demanded of opposing counsel, monitoring exami-
nations for objectionable practices.  
Dingwall, supra note 194, at 900-01.  See Michael Vitiello, Teaching Effective 
Oral Argument Skills: Forget About the Drama Coach, 75 MISS. L.J. 869 
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the typical first-year oral advocacy competition, usually an ap-
pellate argument, which includes instruction in demeanor, ges-
ture, posture, dress, gaze, and voice.200  In addition, clinics,201 
moot court,202 and other types of apprenticeship and initiation 
experiences prepare or require all students to acquire a set of 
highly specific, standardized practices identified as “universal” 
and the physical attributes of rationality and, at the same time, 
the marks of professional lawyering.  The body must be re-
presented as a precondition of legal practice.  “[S]omeone who 
has not mastered the art of presenting himself or herself 
properly has not conquered the confusing and difficult art of 
performing in the courtroom as a successful lawyer.”203  Proper 
representation of the self is the first step in the ability to repre-
sent others.  Overwhelmingly, students are taught that proper 
demeanor is elite and punished for departures from it.204 
Instruction in oral advocacy and judging of student advo-
 
(2006) (arguing that the Socratic method enhances oral argument skills). 
200.  See, e.g., LAUREL CURRIE OATES ET AL., JUST BRIEFS 263-64 (2d ed. 
2013); MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 273-
74 (3d ed. 2010). 
201.  The literature repeats the claim that students will not know how to 
“be” attorneys without association with elders.  See QUINTILIAN, supra note 
20, at XI.iii.10. 
202.  Moot court “emphasize[s] that to communicate as a lawyer—to be 
heard—the writer or speaker must become a member of the culture and 
community of legal practice.”  Stanchi, supra note 121, at 8 (emphasis omit-
ted) (citations omitted).  “The constricting rules governing appearance for 
women contain deeply ingrained stereotypes about women, their sexuality, 
and their competence.”  Mairi N. Morrison, May It Please Whose Court?: How 
Moot Court Perpetuates Gender Bias in the “Real World” of Practice, 6 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 49, 59 (1995).  
203.  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 44.  Morrison comments: 
 
the intricate customs of the club often coalesce to make the 
identity of the oral advocate more important than the ar-
gument she is making. . . . [S]he does have control over con-
formity or lack of conformity to customs. It is these customs 
that separate those who belong to the club from the outsid-
er. Such a separation may affect the perceived credibility of 
the advocate and, therefore, the power of the argument. 
Morrison, supra note 202, at 65. 
204.  Cf. Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, 
and the Possibility of Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 527-29 (2002) (com-
menting on the “elite male student body that is now deployed to discipline 
those embodied differently”). 
44https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1
 2017 EYING THE BODY TO FIND TRUTH 423 
cates focuses on elite delivery.  It begins with the traditional 
choice of appellate advocacy,205 which is asserted to privilege 
legal rationality.  This choice eliminates the need for students 
to consider any strategic advantages of popular delivery (and 
the negative values associated with it), although later in their 
law school career some students may be exposed to trial advo-
cacy after the elite orientation is formed.206  Comments from 
the legal professionals who evaluate student performance in 
oral advocacy focus, first of all, on physical presentation.207  
Small deviations from the elite norm are immediately reproved, 
for example, slouching, pacing, rocking or tapping of the feet, 
touching the face, pen tapping, head tossing, and the like.  Stu-
dents are warned that they must look straight at the judges at 
all times and gesture in moderation, neither too much nor not 
enough.  All the while, students are told to look natural; this 
will be their new nature as attorneys.  In a concession to the 
strategic advantage of popular delivery and also to reassure 
students that the law has some place for them, students with 
animated delivery are often told that they should consider trial 
work – something that appears later, if at all, in most students’ 
law school careers.   
The fact that judges’ comments so frequently address 
presentation rather than content might be explained as indul- 
 
205.  Oral argument is the capstone of the vast majority of first-year le-
gal writing classes.  The 2014 legal writing survey of the first year curricu-
lum showed that 125/176 schools taught appellate argument, 84/176 taught 
pretrial motion argument, and 45/176 taught trial motion argument (some 
schools teach more than one type of argument).  ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & 
LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY (2014), 
http://www.alwd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-Survey-Report-
Final.pdf.  
206.  No school reported teaching oral advocacy in the context of jury or 
bench trials.  Id.  The focus was exclusively on motions or appeals.  Id.  Trial 
advocacy can start in later years with mock trial or moot trial programs or 
specific trial practice programs.   
207.  “The starting point for a good critique is understanding what an 
excellent argument should look and sound like.”  Barbara Kritchevsky, Judg-
ing: The Missing Piece of the Moot Court Puzzle, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 45, 67 
(2006). Standard attention to gaze, voice, gestures, etc., follows, although the 
writer does insist, after beginning with delivery, that substance is more im-
portant, and warns that inexperienced judges focus largely on technique.  See 
id. at 67-73.  The primary focus on delivery has certainly been true in my ex-
perience in almost fifteen years of watching judges provide feedback to stu-
dent advocates. 
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gence toward students’ limited knowledge of legal rules.  How-
ever, another way to understand it is that skilled practitioners 
willing to contribute to the profession by judging and training 
students perceive elite demeanor not as an add-on, but as the 
ground from which recognizable rational legal argument 
emerges, as well as a condition of the coherence of the legal 
field.208  Oral argument is not only about allowing students to 
reason, but also allowing them to practice as attorneys in space 
and develop credible professional bodies that identify them, in 
their own eyes and those of others, as attorneys.209  Not sur-
prisingly, as students progress, they begin to look and sound 
alike.  As they fit themselves into the traditional molds, they 
become pedigreed speakers.  The close nexus among pedigree, 
elite delivery, and success is underlined by the monetary prize 
that goes to the winner of the official, first-year appellate com-
petition.  This clearly figures, for students and professors, the 
rewards to come. 
The traditional, professional repertoire out of which stu-
dents assemble individual rhetorical practices incarnates the 
presuppositions of elite and popular delivery discussed 
above.210  While elite rules of physical credibility may, depend-
ing on students’ class, social, and ethnic background, be 
knowledge they bring with them, legal pedagogy solidifies the 
link between those rules and legal rationality.  Ancient theo-
rists understood “the soul and the body react on each other.  An 
altered trait in the soul will produce an altered shape in the 
body, while an altered form of the body will produce a corre-
sponding change in the soul.”211  Modern theory agrees: “Bodily  
 
208.  A more negative reading, in a vastly more serious context, is that 
“[g]esture politics under dictatorial conditions . . . remains a matter of state 
manipulation, and of seeking to enforce the conformity of the masses through 
the repetition of gestures indicating at least outward commitment to the re-
gime.”  Mary Fulbrook, Embodying the Self: Gestures and Dictatorship in 
Twentieth Century Germany, in THE POLITICS OF GESTURE: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 257, 262 (Braddick ed., 2009).  
209.  For firm-sponsored socializing as an opportunity for first-year stu-
dents to perform as attorneys and to develop the appropriate habitus, see 
Desmond Manderson & Sarah Turner, Law Between the Global and the Lo-
cal: Coffee House: Habitus and Performance Among Law Students, 31 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 649 (2006). 
210.  See supra Section II.A. 
211.  GLEASON, supra note 54, at 29 (citations omitted). 
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hexis [deportment] is political mythology realized, em-bodied, 
turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of 
standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking.”212  
Studies in language acquisition show that: 
 
[G]esture and spoken utterance often have an 
equivalence of function. The emergence of the 
ability to engage in gesture is seen as an integral 
part of the process by which the capacity to use 
language comes about . . . . [B]oth gesture and 
spoken language develop together and . . . they 
both develop in relation to the same combination 
of cognitive capacities . . . . [G]esture and spoken 
utterance are differentiated manifestations of a 
more general process.213 
That general process forms a professional self.214 
  
 
212.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 93-94 (1977) 
(emphasis omitted).  Bourdieu’s concept of habitus clarifies what is at stake, 
that is, “history turned into nature, i.e. denied as such.”  Id. at 78. 
213.  KENDON, supra note 14, at 76.  He is referring primarily to studies 
of language acquisition in young children, but there is no reason to believe 
that the same process is not at work later.  For accounts of this relationship 
and studies illustrating it, see id. at 76-83.  See generally Susan Wagner Cook 
et al., Gesturing Makes Learning Last, COGNITION, Feb. 2008.  The authors 
suggest that “the body can play a significant role in interpreting meaning” 
and “when children are asked to instantiate a new concept in their hands, 
learning is more lasting than when they are asked to instantiate it in words 
alone.”  Id. at 1054.  Further, “gesture can play a causal role in knowledge 
change.” Id. at 1055. 
214.  Rideout observes the necessity of “revoicing” law students so they 
can use the forms of legal discourse.  See Rideout, supra note 49, at 77.  This 
involves transfer from personal voice to a legal voice that “acquires authori-
ty—by virtue of its seeming objectivity and by its reference to underlying lay-
ers of textual authority . . . spoken through the repeated agency of ‘the 
court’ . . . . [This new voice becomes] that student’s self-representation.”  Id. 
at 99-100. 
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Thus, Mertz’s metaphor that “legal translation . . . embod-
ies an epistemology”215 captures the project to transform bodies 
and minds together, recasting both mental and physical pat-
terns.  Accounts of students’ pain and disorientation testify to 
how deeply it reaches into and reforms the self.216  Bourdieu 
comments: 
 
If all societies and, significantly, all the “totali-
tarian institutions” . . . that seek to produce a 
new man through a process of “deculturation” 
and “reculturation” set such store on the seem-
ingly most insignificant details of dress, bearing, 
physical and verbal manners, the reason is that, 
treating the body as a memory, they entrust to it 
in abbreviated and practical, i.e. mnemonic, form 
the fundamental principles of the arbitrary con-
tent of the culture.217 
 
Failure to conform discredits.  The intentional or uninten-
tional violation of elite norms can be understood as subver-
sion.218  There is more here than distrust of those outside the 
group, or those who violate group norms, or individual preju-
 
215.  Mertz, supra note 195, at 110. 
216.  Lani Guinier, Michelle Fine, and Jane Balin describe as “painful” 
for women “the process of becoming a social male,” which may involve having 
“their voices stolen” and alienation “from themselves or who they used to be.”  
LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 48 (1997).  However, the “strong attitudinal differ-
ences between women and men” in the first year undergo “striking homogeni-
zation by year three.” Id. at 28. For scholarship identifying negative conse-
quences of “revoicing” students at law school as they acquire a professional 
voice, a process similar to acquiring the professional body, see Rideout, supra 
note 49, at 81-86. 
217.  BOURDIEU, supra note 212, at 94 (emphasis omitted).  
218.  “Hair seems to be such a little thing. Yet it is the littlest things, the 
small everyday realities of life, that reveal the deepest meanings and values 
of a culture, give legal theory to its grounding and test its legitimacy.”  Pau-
lette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives in the Intersection of Race and Gen-
der, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 366-68 (1991).  Similarly, Cicero was disastrously 
shortsighted when he did not realize the moment he saw Caesar scratching 
his head with one finger that he might overthrow the Roman Republic.  
PLUTARCH, CAESAR IV.8 (Loeb Classical Library) (E.H. Warmington ed., Ber-
nadotte Perrin trans., 1919).   
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dice—although these, too, may be at work.  Nonconformity is 
labeled by the entire tradition as lapse of mind.219  By making 
the wrong gesture, the advocate slips backward into the non-
legal world of the body, deception, particularity, emotionality, 
irrationality, and, finally, insanity.220  This is a particular dan-
ger for women and other non-elite groups.  Their precarious po-
sition requires them to be constantly vigilant in the presenta-
tion of a rational, elite self. 
 
B. Suppressing Popular Delivery as Protection of 
Justice: Contempt 
The elite tradition shapes not only instruction, but prac-
tice.  Local rules and exercise of contempt power that explicitly 
rein in popular strategies enforce the elite paradigm and its 
underlying assumptions.  Meanwhile, popular speakers regard 
their non-elite choices as zealous advocacy.  Popular delivery is 
necessary to counter implicit elite claims to unique credibility 
and to open a gap between elite and non-elite reality and sug-
gest non-elite truths.221  However, non-elite choices in dress, 
voice, and gesture are often targeted and repressed by the judi-
cial system as menacing not just courtroom decorum, but the 
rationality of trial and the integrity of jurors as rational deci-
sion makers. 
United States v. Dowdy illustrates this clash between the 
 
219.  See supra Sections III.B and C. 
220.  “[T]he incorporation of the arbitrary abolishes . . . all the eccentri-
cities and deviations which are the small change of madness.”  BOURDIEU, su-
pra note 212, at 95.  
221.  As one attorney, charged with contempt for failing to appear in a 
coat and tie, argued, “the requirement of a coat and tie impairs his ability to 
represent his clients effectively, because the coat and tie may be viewed by 
jurors with suspicion and may place the attorney at a disadvantage in deal-
ing with the jury.”  Friedman v. Dist. Ct., 611 P.2d 77, 79 (Alaska 1980).  The 
Chief Justice agreed with him, mentioning a “pluralistic society” and “re-
ject[ing] any inference that respect for the judicial system is dependent upon 
male attorneys wearing neckties. Surely the dignity of the judiciary rests on 
more substantial ground.”  Id.  However, even the dissenting judge operated 
within the paradigm that “dress in reasonable attire . . . preserve[s] the dig-
nity of the judiciary and judicial proceedings.”  Id.  The majority on the Alas-
kan Supreme Court found that the judge in the district court acted within his 
power, despite no evidence of disruption to judicial proceedings, and found 
“no merit in his contention that this interferes with [the advocate’s] his duty 
to represent his clients zealously.”  Id.   
49
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institutional allegiance to elite delivery and an advocate’s 
choice of popular delivery.222  In Dowdy, the court held the de-
fense attorney Coe, a woman, in contempt223 under the re-
quired standard: “that Coe had the firmly formed intent to ob-
struct and impede rather than further the search for truth” and 
did, in fact, obstruct justice.224 
Coe’s first crime was that she employed excessive gesture; 
in response to a ruling from the judge, she began what the 
court characterized as “the most outlandish performance this 
court has ever seen . . . [She] began to prance and 
dance[,] . . . grimacing towards the jury and the spectators and 
gesturing with her arms and hands.”225  By transgressing the 
rules of legal enculturation, Coe becomes foreign, “outlandish.”  
She is not within the elite paradigm. Instead, she errs in clas-
sic terms.  “Grimacing” traditionally recalls the body and indi-
cates lack of self-control, thus undermining the rationality and 
truthfulness of speaker.226  Charges of excessive or inappropri-
ate facial gestures are the elite and negative interpretation of 
the “animated facial expressions” recommended in trial manu-
als.227  “Prance and dance” not only reminds us of Cleon, but 
her “performance” is dangerously close to the feminine and the 
theatrical, both fatal to sincerity and truth.  Prancing is char-
acteristic of animals.  Dancing betrays passion, often ungov-
ernable and irrational.  Quintilian often finds reason to make 
sure that speakers will never be close to dancing.228  Of course, 
 
222.  See United States v. Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Mo. 1991). 
223.  She was also publicly reprimanded after disciplinary procedures.  
See In re Coe, 903 S.W.2d 916 (Mo. 1995). 
224.  Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 577.  The court intervened at least once, 
sua sponte, to cut off the attorney’s speech.  Id. at 579. 
225.  Id. at 578. 
226.  Thus, for example, grimacing is an aspect of “day in the life videos” 
that “bring us into deeper intimacy with the suffering body” and is frowned 
on by courts.  Jody Lyneé Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understand-
ing Judicial Constraints on Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 137, 170 (2006).  
227.  See SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 70, at 266, 300. 
228.  Dancing, particularly women dancing, has long been a threat to 
order and ordinary truth.  See, e.g., EURIPIDES, THE BACCHAE (Geoffrey S. 
Kirk trans., 1970) (women begin by dancing in the mountains and end by 
tearing the king limb from limb); Dwyer v. People, 261 P. 858, 859 (Colo. 
1927) (holding that “public dance halls may be regulated under the police 
power . . . [because] uncontrolled, their tendency is to weaken morals and 
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these actions are emphatically non-elite: the polar opposite of 
the proper martial walk and stance. 
The threatening presence of the body is confirmed by the 
court’s invocation of the offensive “arms and hands,” a detail 
which is utterly unnecessary for the sense, which is conveyed 
by “gesturing.”  Further, Coe is “waving” them; clearly, her 
arms are making large motions outside the gestural box.  She 
is exposing her sides to attack, and her excessive movement 
means she is not in control of her body.  In terms of the elite 
model, the female advocate, independent of what she is saying, 
is becoming a woman and a body first and a lawyer second, or 
not at all.  She has moved out of and below the world of law 
and elite delivery.  Her weakness, exposed in her waving, men-
aces truth because it implicates her and her audience in the 
corporal imperatives that foster irrationality and lies.  The jin-
gling language of the court in “prance and dance” underlines 
the extent to which her behavior is disrupting the ordinary flow 
of legal language and suggests the repetitive monotony of 
speech where words are sounds, not sense. 
The court conflates mental and physical imbalance in the 
familiar association of inappropriate delivery with the female 
and the insane: “Coe argued with the court’s ruling, twice in-
voked the name of Jesus in arguing her position, in a state of 
near hysteria.”229  Jesus, here, reminds us of Quintilian’s ob-
servation that improper motion could reveal a speaker to be a 
fanatic.230  Hysteria is a female mental disease, a product of the 
feminine body, outgrowth of the disordered womb.231  It lies in 
wait for all women to disqualify them from the disembodied 
world of rational male discourse and the law, instead imprison-
ing them in the corporal irrationality.  Its symptoms are con-
firmed when we learn that Coe was “out of control in her con-
duct.”232  Lack of mental control is fatal to rationality.  The 
entire description naturalizes Coe’s actions as her inevitable  
 
breed disorder and indolence”). 
229.  Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 578-79. 
230.  See supra Section II.B. 
231.  “Hysteric” derives from the Greek word for womb, “hustera.”  
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 864 (3d ed. 2010).  See supra Section II.B and 
notes for the traditional view of the impact of the womb on women’s speech.  
232.  Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 579. 
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character, a characterization to which she is particularly sus-
ceptible because she begins as one of the potentially vulnera-
ble: a woman. 
Yet the court simultaneously interprets Coe’s violation of 
the rules of elite decorum as natural evidence of character and 
mental state and as strategically chosen, popular rhetoric.  Her 
conduct is willful and designed to frustrate the search for 
truth.  Instead it focuses on personal gain, hers and her cli-
ent’s.233  And, as is only to be expected, Coe’s popular delivery 
has a detrimental effect on its audience.  Expansive gestures 
are evidence of personal corruption that is dangerously conta-
gious.  This provides another reason for her suppression: to 
“shortstop[] the reaction from the sizable aggregation of specta-
tors obviously friendly to Dowdy.”234  The spectators are a 
herd,235 driven along by Coe.  The court does not tell us how it 
determined that the spectators were personally biased, obvi-
ously friendly to Dowdy.  It asserts their corruption as fact, ex-
plained and reinforced by their also unexplained receptivity to 
Coe’s actions.  We do not know, and do not need to know, the 
evidence of this friendliness; it is assumed as part of the para-
digm of popular delivery, which pairs such listeners to a popu-
lar speaker.  The risk to the audience also underwrites the ap-
pellate opinion upholding the lower court’s actions.  Coe’s 
“actions threatened to shift the focus of the trial away from the 
witnesses and the facts and onto herself and her relationship 
with the trial judge.  Such distractions hamper the administra-
 
233.  According to the case: 
 
throughout the trial on a daily basis it was clear to the court 
that Coe had the firmly formed intent to obstruct and im-
pede rather than further the search for truth and that she 
was committed to a course of action that went far beyond 
any called for in the performance of an advocate’s effective 
representation of his or her client. 
 Id. at 577. 
234.  See id. at 578. 
235.  Aggregation is from the Latin word “grex,” used for a herd, particu-
larly of sheep, then applied to a crowd. Aggregation, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
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tion of justice by diverting a jury’s attention from the real is-
sues before it.”236 
Thus, the court recycled traditional and familiar justifica-
tions in finding Coe in contempt.  Repeated judicial rhetoric 
links the courts’ commitment to truth and justice to mainte-
nance of elite decorum by force.  Popular delivery is disorder, 
by definition. 
 
It is essential to the proper administration of 
criminal justice that dignity, order and decorum 
be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our 
country.” Preservation of the liberties of citizens, 
when on trial for crimes charged against them, 
demands order in the courtroom. Absent such or-
der, no trial can be fair.237 
 
All this makes it quite clear why Coe must be suppressed.238 
Coe’s representation of her client is available primarily 
from the opinions of the trial and appellate courts, whose 
phrasing condemns Coe’s popular delivery in the usual terms 
for its negative impact on rational decision-making.  Her actual 
argument, her position, is irrelevant, at least in the first hold-
ing of contempt.  What we can know of the events in the court-
room is heavily filtered through an elite paradigm.  However, 
the jury verdict suggests an alternative story about Coe, the ju-
ry, and the trial.  Coe’s delivery can just as easily be under-
stood as strategic, the adoption of popular delivery.239  She was 
zealously, and successfully, advocating for her client240 by en-
 
236.  United States v. Dowdy, 960 F.2d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1992). 
237.  Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 579. 
238.  In a Catch-22, the defendants’ motions for a new trial were denied 
because Coe’s conduct did not make any difference.  See United States v. 
Turner, 975 F.2d 490, 493 (8th Cir. 1992). 
239.  For a number of contempt orders against such defense attorneys 
due, in part, to the style that they adopt to make their points, see Louis S. 
Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial 
Contempt Power, 65 WASH. L. REV. 477, 583-86 (1990). 
240.  Coe’s defense was “that in each instance she acted zealously, not 
contemptuously, because her actions were necessary to explicate her position 
and to preserve a record for appellate review.”  Dowdy, 960 F.2d at 81.  The 
court rejected her justification.  Id.  
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acting a typical popular strategy: put the government on trial.  
And she was at least partially successful.  The trial lasted thir-
ty-eight days.241  After five days of deliberation, the jury found 
her client guilty of only four counts out of the twenty with 
which he was charged.242 From the perspective of elite delivery, 
this may be further evidence justifying her suppression.  In-
deed, the trial court found that her conduct constituted a situa-
tion “where instant action is necessary to protect the judicial 
institution itself.”243 But consideration of the jury verdict sug-
gests another way of conceptualizing Coe’s actions: she func-
tioned as a successful popular advocate adopting non-elite de-
meanor as the basis for credibility in conveying a non-elite 
truth to the jury.244 
 
V. JUSTIFYING LEGAL DECISION-MAKING: THE 
PROBLEM OF ACTING, LEAKAGE, AND UNIVERSAL 
BODY LANGUAGE 
 
The elite rhetorical tradition successfully combined a foun-
dational claim—the body is a touchstone of credibility—with a 
potent political assertion: the bodily signals of rationality and 
truth track the habits of elite warrior speakers.  Conversely, 
the same paradigm condemns non-elite speakers appealing to 
the democratic masses as deceptive and irrational—claims 
proven by their rejection of elite rules and adoption of other 
demeanor.  The next step was equally important: the notion of 
a universal human body language that includes inevitable 
“leakage”245 of involuntary nonverbal clues of deception.  These 
twin assumptions had two enormous benefits: First, they con-
tain the risk of the persuasive skills promised by professional 
instruction, including in demeanor, through a universal human 
 
241.  Dowdy, 764 F. Supp. at 577. 
242.  One count was dismissed by the court, as well.  Id. 
243.  Id. at 579 (quoting Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 
(1965)). 
244.  The record supports this was her approach in recording her repeat-
ed questions of government witnesses, probably to insinuate they are lying.  
Dowdy, 960 F.2d at 79-80. 
245.  The term is associated with Paul Ekman.  See Ekman & Friesen, 
supra note 38, at 88.  It is now a common way to identify bodily basis of lie 
detection.  See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 32, at 535-36.  
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ability to read the equally universal signs of the body.  Second, 
they justify imperial, elite judgment of the credibility of outsid-
ers, including women, poor citizens, and foreigners, as based on 
nature, assuaging any anxiety about personal or systemic igno-
rance. 
Delivery, or non-verbal communication’s rules, derives 
from a common understanding: “listener-viewers stare at you, 
scrutinizing each small movement. Small components of 
movement, sound, and words—your individual persuasive 
techniques—quickly add up to a general perception and ulti-
mately to a trial outcome.”246 (Note the damaging connection of 
persuasion and trial in this passage.)  Although tradition splits 
on exactly what proper habits may be – popular or elite – both 
sides agree the credible body requires the conscious suppres-
sion of certain gestures and the acquisition of new bodily habits 
that will be the repertoire of truthfulness, that is, paradoxically 
strategies.247 
The emphasis on delivery as strategy has several ad-
vantages.  Most obvious is the role of expertise in creating and 
sustaining a market for professional speakers and, of course, 
instructors while acting as a barrier to those identified as un-
skilled.  Thus, it preserves social and intellectual capital.  
However, the notion of strategy also plays a role inside the rhe-
torical struggle between elite and popular delivery.  It miti-
gates the threat of the undeniably effective techniques of popu-
lar delivery, at least to speakers of impeccable elite credentials.  
History records the migration of various techniques of delivery 
from the popular to the elite repertoire.248  As strategies, such 
techniques become mental product, not bodily expression.  Elite 
speakers249 can then exploit popular trademarks like emotion, 
 
246.  84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 1.  The well-trained speaker 
“use[s] certain tones according as he wishes to seem himself to be moved and 
to sway the minds of his audience.”  CICERO, ORATOR, supra note 20, at xvii 
55. 
247.  See supra Section IV.A. 
248.  Even the trademark ancient gesture of slapping the thigh became 
acceptable when attempting to arouse emotion, particularly at trial, see 
CICERO, BRUTUS, supra note 20, at lxxx.278, likewise, stamping the foot.  See 
also QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.123.  
249.  See supra Section III for the condemnation of lower-class speakers 
who fail to conform to the requirements of elite speech. They are not granted 
the license of elite speakers.  “[L]ow status violators [of communicative 
55
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gestures, and loud voice without positioning themselves on the 
wrong side of the mind/body divide.  But, as noted above, the 
same is not true of non-elite speakers or their audience. Both 
remain subject to the link between popular delivery and irra-
tionality.250 
Once non-verbal communication becomes a product of skill, 
the next step has been obvious: the stage is an excellent re-
source251 for, “[a]s all actors know, only the practiced hand . . . 
can make the natural gesture.”252  While advice to look to act-
ing for help with speaking has been given for over two thou-
sand years, theatricality raises the specter of lies and severs 
the connection between the character of the speaker and the 
manner of speaking.253  For this reason, the distinction between 
acting and arguing is carefully maintained.  Those who advise 
instruction from actors often find themselves in the paradoxical 
position of asserting that, really, truth and the advocate’s own 
nature are the best persuasion.  This is summed up in the fa-
 
norms] are perceived negatively, while high status ones are not. . . . The same 
nonverbal act may hold different meanings in varying contexts depending 
upon one’s status in the proceedings.”  Searcy et al., supra note 107, at 43.  
250.  Quintilian ends instruction on delivery with the point that con-
temporary delivery is more excited, but requires care not to lose in the ele-
gance of an actor the authority of a good man (“bonus,” a word for the elite).  
QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.184.  
251.  Aristotle links the impact of delivery to actors, something he de-
plores.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, §1403b,1404a.  Acting is a frequent com-
parison for Quintilian, who begins his entire discussion of delivery with a 
consideration of the power of actors.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at IX.iii.4.  
Demosthenes took instruction from actors; Cicero recommends it. Id. at 
XI.iii.7. For additional discussion and passages, see BALL, supra note 76, and 
infra for the similar modern views.  
252.  Otto G. Obermaier, Judge Conducted Voir Dire, 340 PRACTICING L. 
INST. LITIG. 151 (1987).  See also 28 AM. JUR. TRIALS 599 Principles of Sum-
mation § 1 (2016); Matheo & DeCaro, supra note 46, at 30-31; ARON ET AL., 
supra note 90, at ch. 14 §§ 2.05-.06.  Sayler and Shadel begin their discussion 
of delivery by acknowledging the necessity of sounding “natural” while engag-
ing in an unnatural act, public speaking.  SAYLER & SHADEL, supra note 16, at 
56-61.  They invoke the theater while innovating, from the tradition’s per-
spective, with the figure of an actress. Id.  This illustrates the flexibility of 
the tradition in accommodating new speakers while maintaining its underly-
ing conceptual framework.  Id. 
253.  Gunderson discusses many passages maintaining the distinction: 
“The orator is associated with truth and the spirit; the actor with fiction and 
the body.”  Gunderson, supra note 54, at 112.  For the distinction between 
Roman actors and orators, even while speakers were encouraged to learn 
from actors, see Graf, supra note 54, passim.  
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mous dictum: “As a man lives so will he speak.”254  Yet this re-
mark performs an ideological function only. It is not allowed to 
interfere with detailed instruction, insisting that being “him-
self” requires rigid adherence to precise, and remarkably con-
sistent, instructions about style and delivery. 
The point, of course, is to sustain the role of skill in looking 
credible in the eyes of others, yet maintain a link to inner 
truth.  The tension is obvious.  Quintilian requires that the 
speaker find even simulated emotion within himself: “the main 
thing is to excite the appropriate feeling in oneself, to form a 
mental picture of the facts, and to exhibit an emotion that can-
not be distinguished from the truth.”255  The same method is 
embraced today as solving ethical and practical problems.  
“Our practical suggestion to lawyers in court is: be natural, be 
yourself.  Analyze what your personality and human character-
istics can do, and extract from this your own potential and de-
velop with practice and work your own inner qualities.”256  Alt-
hough the nature called into the arena of speech is identified 
with “your personality and human characteristics,” the subor-
dination of the “self” to the needs of physical credibility is hard 
to overlook. 
The struggle to root the rhetorical self in some underlying 
extra-rhetorical reality that nevertheless supports the persua-
sive endeavor points at the paradox in truth-seeking carried 
out via adversarial speakers, particularly when skill enters the 
equation.  The potency of strategic non-verbal communication 
undermines the decision-making process; it raises the risk of 
 
254.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.i.30. 
255.  Id. at IX.iii.62.  An authority who defends the necessity of acting 
(and quotes Quintilian) argues:  
 
[T]he actor remains himself or herself, drawing on his or her 
personal store of emotional memory to provide authenticity 
in his or her reaction to the script, rather than ‘faking it’ by 
some series of conventional, but contrived, external ges-
tures. . . . [T]here is an authentic approach to acting in the 
courtroom, just as there is on stage. . . . [T]he lawyer does 
not adopt a courtroom demeanor, and, like Sir John Giel-
gud, plays only himself or herself. 
Peter W. Murphy, “There’s No Business Like. . .?” Some Thoughts on the Eth-
ics of Acting in the Courtroom, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 116-17 (2002).  
256.  ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 14.21.  
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deceit.  If an expert speaker can deploy a highly disciplined and 
credible self, what will ensure that such a speaker is, in fact, 
truthful, rather than credible?  How can decision making be 
saved from skill designed to manipulate it? 
One way to reduce the risk of deceit is speakers’ personal 
virtue—thus, the insistent claim, already referenced above, 
that to be a good speaker one must be a good man.  This claim 
consolidates advantage and social and cultural capital by mak-
ing instruction something sinister.  Yet it has been a common-
place of teachers of non-verbal communication since antiqui-
ty.257  Minimally, it deflects censure and promotes the utility of 
an instrumental virtue: be what you wish to seem in order to 
seem it successfully.  But most instruction and discussion is 
more ambitious.  As discussed above, rigorous training in the 
proper demeanor is considered not only to produce an accom-
plished speaker, but to educate character.  Training in the cor-
rect physical signifiers of credibility ultimately corrects the 
person, or the soul.  This assimilates conventional require-
ments of delivery and personal morality, or, put in another 
way, learning the rules and becoming the rules. 
What we now call leakage, that is, bodily signs of deceit or 
emotion, is another strategy to protect the institutional project 
of truth seeking.  Ancient and modern theory posit an unavoid-
able link between internal and external, conceptualized vari-
ously as soul, character, mind, and so forth:258 
 
In order to be able to persuade, the trial attorney 
must be personally convinced that he or she is 
fulfilling a mission, the role of the advocate in 
achieving justice. It is the advocate’s duty to per-
form this mission with conscience because advo-
 
257.  A competing view reverses the equation: delivery that owes noth-
ing to art and is simply an expression of the soul is best. As is to be expected 
in a teacher of rhetoric, including delivery, QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at 
XI.iii.10, dismisses it while paying allegiance to the elite claim that proper 
demeanor is an aspect of character: an orator, to be good, must be a good 
man.  Id. at I.Pr.9.  See JAMES W. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY 7 (2d ed. 1993); 72 
AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, §§ 5, 9.  
258.  Quintilian, for example, begins his instruction on gesture by link-
ing the quality of the voice, gesture, glance and gait to the mind in the con-
text of introducing instruction.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at IX.iii.62, 65, 66. 
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cacy without conscience is like a body without a 
soul.259 
 
This link underlies the standard claim that it “has long 
been recognized that our bodies can reveal our true thoughts 
and emotions, even when we try to hide them from others.”260  
These inevitable leaks check the impulse to lie because they 
provide a body language of deception.  The tradition’s efforts 
are expressed in a core image: the hand is index to the mind.  
The phrase is Cicero’s,261 but the premise resonates today, of-
ten asserted through Freud’s famous statement: “He that has 
eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mor-
tal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his 
finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.”262  Yes this 
is the same hand, discussed above, that learns to make “natu-
ral” gestures.  The contradictory uses of this image underscore 
the tensions between rhetorical skill and decision-making, par-
ticularly based on a unitary ideal of truth. 
Adoption of the body as the reliable gauge of truthfulness 
tracks the conception of the body as autonomous and ungov-
ernable that underwrites the rejection of popular delivery.  
Skill fails before incarnated fear, desire, and passion.  “Juries 
recognize lawyers who have questionable ethics in the court-
room often because they inadvertently spill subtle and some-
times blatant cues, which trigger reactions in the jurors and 
clue the jurors into the lawyers’ true natures.”263  Yet the clues 
to deceit remain as much creatures of rhetorical theory as the 
gestures of truthfulness.  Although long debunked by research, 
the tells remain those prohibited by elite rules: blinking, fid-
 
259.  ARON ET AL., supra note 90, at 1-26. 
260.  JURYWORK, supra note 114, § 15.10.  Another treatise asks: “The 
question becomes, can an unethical advocate completely cover up his or her 
nature to the point that jurors are dupes? . . . probably not.”  72 AM. JUR. 
TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 11. 
261.  See Graf, supra note 54, at 40. 
262.  Quoted, for example, in Timony, supra note 32, at 903 n.2.  See also 
JURYWORK, supra note 114, § 15:10 (continuing with advice that although this 
may not be true, people believe that it is and act accordingly at trials and 
elsewhere). 
263.  72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 7. 
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dling, repetitive gestures, indirect gaze, etc.264  “[I]t is much 
harder for them [speakers] to lie with their bodies. . . . [T]here 
are always little gestures that give away the truth. It may be 
the classic “nose wipe” or undue eye blinking or improper eye 
contact.”265  Thus, a gesture like scratching the nose, expressive 
from the very beginning of the class struggle echoed in the 
philosophical and rhetorical controversies over democracy, re-
mains, counter to all evidence, the sign of the liar.266 
Effective functioning of the elite paradigm, however, re-
quires a further step, foundational to the court systems: that 
“natural” signs267 are part of a universal, bodily language con-
stant across individuals and cultures.268  Cicero sets the stage: 
“Every motion of the soul has its natural appearance, voice and 
gesture; and the entire body of a man, all his facial and vocal 
expressions, like the strings of a harp, sound just as the soul’s 
motion strikes them.”269  This is much more than a statement 
that speech is created by physical motions in human bodies.  
Cicero begins, here, by asserting the inevitable linkage of inner 
 
264.  Similarly, police manuals list non-verbal signs of deception and an 
entire method, the Behavioral Analysis Interview, depend on particular be-
havioral responses from which the interrogator can ascertain the suspect’s 
guilt or innocence.  The interrogator is to “focus primarily on the suspect’s 
behavioral responses rather than the actual content of his answers.”  Richard 
A. Leo, The Third Degree, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND ENTRAPMENT 
65 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004).  They include “shifting posture. . . stroking 
the back of one’s head or hair, . . . shuffling or tapping one’s feet, . . . placing 
one’s hand over the mouth or eyes, crossing one’s arms or legs” and so forth.  
Id.  Innocence is predicated on perception of truthfulness; guilt on deception.  
Id. at 66.  Leo concludes that these methods rest on “little more than the sub-
jective hunches and personal judgments of the investigator. There is, no 
short, no reason to believe that their diagnostic value is any better than 
chance.”  Id. at 79.  The advice and individual hunches are products of the 
classical rhetorical tradition: the behaviors characteristic of deception match 
markers of the vulnerable speaker.  See Minzner, supra note 3, at 2560. 
265.  ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 5:3.  For shifty eyes as indicators of 
deception, see, e.g., Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
855 F.2d 963, 974 (2d Cir. 1988).  
266.  See Appendix A. 
267.  The discussion of gesture claims a common language of hands, in 
spite of differences in language.  QUINTILIAN, supra note 20, at XI.iii.87.  
268.  Recent work on recognition of emotions across cultures both vali-
dates and sets tight limits on the universal natural bodily language compre-
hensible by all despite cultural differences.  See Matsumoto & Hwang, supra 
note 36, at 227-29. 
269.  DE OR, supra note 20, at III.216; Graf, supra note 54, at 41. 
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and outer; he ends gestures and voice to the sounds produced 
by a skilled musician.270  The same conceptual complex emerg-
es in the opening section of a well-known book on trial commu-
nication by a judge, an expert in non-verbal communication, 
and an attorney: 
 
Body language is expressed in a variety of ways. 
Everybody is familiar with gestures: the hand to 
the cheek that says, “Oh God!” or the scratching 
of the hair behind the ear that signals, “Let me 
think.” Rodin’s famous sculpture, The Thinker, 
used the chin supported by a closed fist to convey 
a universal signal of thoughtfulness. That simple 
gesture speaks more to a viewer than all the de-
scriptive words written about the statue.271 
 
Thus, products of particular, elite, artistic traditions represent 
a universalized physical language everybody knows.272 
A postulated universal natural language of the body reme-
dies problems of ignorance and skill, bedeviling decision in our 
rhetorical-legal tradition: 
 
[A]ll the factors of delivery contain a certain force 
bestowed by nature; which moreover is the rea-
son [that] it is delivery that has most effect on 
the ignorant and the mob and lastly on barbari-
ans; for words influence nobody but the person 
 
270.  DE OR, supra note 20, at III.213-217. 
271.  ARON ET AL., supra note 90, § 2.02.  The same authors, two sections 
later, acknowledge that body language is largely cultural.  Id. § 2.04.   
272.  As Bob Gibbins and A. Russell Smith comment:  
 
[a]lmost everyone will recognize certain universal body lan-
guage messages. For example, one universal sign of defen-
siveness is the arms crossed on the chest. Another signal 
which can be revealing is the nose-rub or nose-touching. . .  
While it is beyond the scope of this book to define or catalog 
every nonverbal signal of significance, the advocate will be 
aware of many of them without any formal training or even 
casual study. It is important to bring this knowledge into 
play during trial. 
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 74:8 (Hodson ed., 3d ed. 2001). 
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allied to the speaker by sharing the same lan-
guage, and clever ideas frequently outfly the un-
derstanding of people who are not clever, where-
as delivery, which gives the emotion of the mind 
expression, influences everybody, for the same 
emotions are felt by all people and they both rec-
ognize them in others and manifest them in 
themselves by the same marks.273 
 
Demeanor flourishes, in our tradition, in the context of de-
ficiency.  It works most magically when the listener cannot 
check,274 or perhaps even comprehend, what is said.275 This po-
tentially explosive situation is remedied by a postulated com-
mon humanity; everyone, even a barbarian, can at least read 
the body.276  Yet the “consensus that relegated credibility to the 
 
273.  DE OR, supra note 20, at III.lix.223.  
274.  Popular delivery rejects the idea that there are people, events, or 
venues of decision in which persuasion is not key.  However, the elite tradi-
tion assigns persuasion, and with it delivery as a popular tactic, to the igno-
rant.  See PLATO, GORGIAS 462d-466a, supra note 127 (rhetoric compared to 
cookery for the ignorant); ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, § 1403b-1404a.  Thus, in 
trial “it is imperative that trial lawyers learn to mask to some extent. They 
are paid to mask their true feelings, for the most part, and give the best pro-
tection they can for their clients.”  84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 23.  
“Jurors in their quest to determine justice look anxiously at trial lawyers and 
their clients to determine ‘truth.’ They study them intently.”  Id. § 4.  
  
Jurors search the lawyer’s face and expressions, seeking 
sincerity and commitment. . . for signs of character and 
truth in facial configuration and expression. An inner char-
acter may be seen in the form or the shape of the features, 
the manner of arrangement, and the position of the parts, 
that radiates strength and power. 
72 AM. JUR. TRIALS 137, supra note 41, § 46.  
275.  “When jurors tune out substantive testimony, serious consequences 
follow. Adler observed, ‘Rocky and the others often found themselves focusing 
on more concrete matters. Foster wore his suits too tight; another lawyer 
picked his nose.’ He is right– the irrelevant becomes relevant, and often 
amusing.”  Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk From Complexity, the 
New Media, and Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995).  
276.  Cicero observes that delivery (composed of voice and action) is like 
speech or a sort of eloquence of the body. Quoted by QUINTILIAN, supra note 
20, at IX.iii.1.  The metaphor is common: “[L]awyers should realize that their 
own gestures in court either will help or hurt their cases because gestures 
change their spoken words, and, when not speaking, gesturing, posture, and 
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realm of common knowledge”277 is a product of a rhetorical tra-
dition of imperial, multi-ethnic, slavery-based societies in 
which law was the pastime of the ruling elite.  In this context, 
postulating a common body and universal, natural bodily lan-
guage is risky, but necessary.  It frees members of the legal re-
gime from worry about ignorance and any obligation to recog-
nize difference—because, naturally, this difference simply does 
not exist.  This stripping to a postulated natural body is a re-
quired first step in the creation of the abstract legal partici-
pant.  As Peter Goodrich points out in the context of clothes, 
“before the law there are only individuals, subjects that can be 
reconstructed as legal actors, abstract subjects, individuals 
without clothes, certainly without all that clothes implies, 
namely the social and ceremonial dimensions of collective and 
ethnic life, the material and social habitus of the individual.”278  
The postulated natural language of the body also rescues the 
practice of legal skill from a potential charge of deception, for 
all can understand its message.  Thus, it underwrites the ad-
versarial system and “wide latitude [for] trial lawyers to de-
termine how best to expose the strengths and weaknesses of 
witnesses. . . . It is assumed that the nature of the adversarial 
process provides the necessary inducement and that juries are 
fully capable of evaluating the information provided,”279 as is 
that product of elite legal rhetorical education, the judge. 
Thus, the assumptions of our rhetorical tradition sustain 
performance and judgment.  A modern handbook captures the 
dynamic when, after extolling skillful demeanor and instruc-
tion in acting, it pivots to remind the reader: 
 
There are lawyers who think that to enhance 
their role as prosecutors or defenders, they must 
be good actors, but that is not necessarily true. 
Before persuading a jury or a judge, counsel 
 
movement cues are ‘read’ as an unspoken language of their own.”  84 AM. 
JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 2.  See generally G. NIERENBERG & H. CALERO, 
HOW TO READ A PERSON LIKE A BOOK (1971).  
277.  Blinka, supra note 8, at 367. See also Jane H. Aiken, Teaching the 
Rules of “Truth”, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1075, 1083 (2006). 
278.  PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF THE LAW 181 (1990). 
279.  Blinka, supra note 8, at 368. 
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must be personally persuaded that his or her po-
sition is the right one. . . . If a lawyer takes a po-
sition that he or she does not believe, something 
in the advocate’s voice or body language will be-
tray the words, no matter how eloquently the ar-
gument is phrased.  There is an invisible link be-
tween what the lawyer thinks and feels and what 
he or she is saying; judges and jurors have a spe-
cial ability to detect these feelings.  A lawyer is 
not an actor and must not be seduced by the false 
idea that acting will be an effective tool for per-
suasion.280 
 
This fascinating passage labors to reconcile paradoxes in-
herent in the tradition of delivery even as it exploits them to 
justify ancient foundations of our legal system: orality as a 
predicate for decision making, the propriety of credibility as-
sessments by the audience, the dominance of an elite view of 
unitary and universal truth, and, critically, the claims to skill 
and virtue of the legal profession.  The strategically flexible 
characterization of listeners—at once open to manipulation and 
endowed with an unvarying nose for deceit—combine with the 
rules of demeanor and the ancient ideology of leakage and uni-
versal body language to maintain fundamental institutional 
and professional claims, explaining how rhetorical jousting by 
highly skilled speakers seeking to attain personal ends will 




280.  ARON ET AL., supra note 90, §14.21 (acting is recommended in 
§ 2.05). 
281.  This is closely related to the role of the jury as a black box in main-
taining institutional legitimacy.  See Fisher, supra note 9, at 587-602.  
“[A]lthough the jury does not guarantee accurate lie detecting, it does detect 
lies in a way that appears accurate . . . By making the jury its lie detector, 
the system protects its own legitimacy.”  Id. at 578-79. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: The Promise of Uniformity and 
Necessity of Blind Justice 
 
Professional allegiance to the paradigm of elite demeanor 
has social benefits. Enculturation into the paradigm dresses 
law students and attorneys in a professional uniform.  Like the 
ubiquitous dark suits adopted by 1Ls, it smoothes pre-
professional differences.282  Elite demeanor is a badge of profes-
sional identity that signals inclusion in the professional world 
from which, at least, historically, other parts of students’ and 
attorneys’ identities might exclude them.  For this reason 
alone, it should be taught to all students rather than being the 
exclusive possession of those who inherit the knowledge as a 
form of social capital.283  Further, instruction in delivery is part 
of a professionalization project that links students, in this case 
physically, to a lineage of virtuous professional elders who pro-
vide exempla for future excellence, a project enhanced by the 
moral meaning read into this physical exercise.284 Like other 
 
282.  As Charles M. Yablon comments: 
 
[a]nyone who has ever observed an American law school 
during interview season, with everyone wearing the same 
blue pin stripe suit, carrying the same resume, and mouth-
ing the same platitudes. (‘Yes, I’m sure that working on col-
lateralized receivable financing deals will be very exciting’) 
knows that it does not take wigs to remove differences of 
gender, race, and age. All it takes is a first rate legal educa-
tion.   
Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: an Essay on Wigs, Robes and Legal 
Change, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1129, 1142 (1995).  For the cost of this uniform in 
abstracting legal subjects and their representatives paralleling the choice of 
discourse and of language itself, see GOODRICH, note 278, at 180-81. 
283.  This double-edged aspect of instruction in delivery—liberating, yet 
imprisoning—associates it with the processes of abstraction and opportunity 
inherent in the common law itself and its “linguistic ideology” as discussed by 
MERTZ, supra note 195, at 212-20. 
284.  This physical chain of past and present attorneys enhances identi-
fication with the profession and its goals tied to a future inhabited by rein-
carnations of the same ideal.  Similarly, originalism and fidelity to the Con-
stitution as “our law” promote “an identification between ourselves, those 
who lived in the past and those who will live in the future . . . that connect[s] 
past generations to present ones through a process of narrative identifica-
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invocations of precedential authority, backward looking bodily 
quoting is the sine qua non of meaningful participation in our 
legal regime, independent of content.  Its effect has much in 
common with similar benefits detected in originalism and other 
types of constitutional argument.285  In this analysis, “ethical 
originalism” establishes a unity of field for the groups “Ameri-
cans” and attorneys.286  This unity produced through a common 
form exists despite the content and purpose of individual ar-
guments.  That this is a fictive unity,287 a product of “cultural 
memory,” not historical accuracy,288 in no way diminishes its 
importance to its participants and the civic project of rooting 
both participants and all citizens in continuously redefined, yet 
American, experience.289 
Enhanced instruction about demeanor can preserve its pro-
fessional benefits—and extend them to students who may oth-
erwise lack them and to their future clients—while mitigating 
the individual cost of assimilation to such norms.  The variants 
of delivery and their conceptual framework should be taught as 
historically determined, arbitrary markers whose acquisition is 
a matter of joining a professional discourse community.  Stra-
tegic choices in delivery can be understood as skillful profes-
sionalism, not personal proficiency or deficiency in morality, 
 
tion . . . as part of a larger political project that stretches back to the present 
and forward to the future.”  Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitu-
tional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 465 (2007). 
285.  “Arguments from ethos and tradition often call for us to remember 
what ‘‘we’—here a transgenerational subject—fought for, what we stand for, 
what we promised we would do, and what we promised we would never let 
happen again.”  Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of Histo-
ry, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 684 (2013).  For a similar effect of classical rhe-
torical education, see HABINEK, supra note 14, at 72-76. 
286.  “The core framers are heroes and celebrities, and the project of 
identifying original meanings asks us to stand in their shoes. It is no wonder 
that so many people like doing it.”  Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical 
Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 79, 84 (2010).  Physical imagery conveys concep-
tual adherence. 
287.  Balkin, supra note 285, at 684-85. 
288.  Id. at 694-97.  
289.  “Enabling citizens and officials to identify with the major figures of 
their national political traditions serves important civic functions. It encour-
ages them to relate to the governing regime as their own, rather than as 
something alien or imposed. That attitude toward government is an im-
portant element of legitimacy.”  Primus, supra note 286, at 84.  
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rationality, or credibility.290  Explicit instruction about the fal-
libility of traditional markers of credibility may help future at-
torneys and judges work properly with a wider variety of indi-
viduals.  Understanding the historical, ideological basis for the 
assignment of rationality to elite, and irrationality to popular, 
demeanor may trickle up to promote reassessment of the rules 
governing trial and practices of decision making. 
Yet changed instruction will only indirectly reduce the 
much steeper costs of the current paradigm paid by other par-
ticipants in the legal regime, by society, and by the judicial sys-
tem itself for the errors introduced by traditional, institutional 
reliance on physical credibility.291  People from diverse social, 
ethnic, racial, religious, physical, or cultural backgrounds, in-
cluding minorities,292 immigrants, and asylum seekers,293 indi-
 
290.  For this approach to instruction in fundamental skills in written 
content, for example, grammar, punctuation, and style, often also associated 
with moral and personal values, see Jeremy Francis, Daphne O’Regan & 
Ryan Black, Designing Success: Motivating and Measuring Successful 1L 
Student Engagement in an Optional, Proficiency-Based Program Teaching 
Grammar and Punctuation, 21 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. (2016), 
http://www.legalwritingjournal.org/2016/09/15/designing-success-motivating-
and-measuring-successful-1l-student-engagement-in-an-optional-proficiency-
based-program-teaching-grammar-and-punctuation/.  Primus’ analysis of 
originalism traces its power to “whether their audiences recognize them-
selves, or perhaps their idealized selves, in the portrait of American origins 
that is on offer.”  Primus, supra note 286, at 80.  A similar value of such con-
stitutional argument is “subjective identification with the regime.”  Richard 
A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 
203 (2008). 
291.  For example, in asylum cases, the “credibility determination pre-
sents obstacles that favor the fraudulent applicant over the genuine asylum 
seeker.”  Rose Linton, Note, A Presumption of Disclosure: Towards Greater 
Transparency in Asylum Proceedings, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1069, 1083 
(2015).  A well-rehearsed, false story can avoid “factors that can make a genu-
ine applicant appear evasive during her direct testimony—cultural norms, 
PTSD, and negative experiences with officials.”  Id. at 1087.  The same idea 
underlies the well-known practice to rehearse witnesses.  Similarly, original-
ism may degrade decision-making, and identification with an idealized past 
undermines change.  See Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and Mobilizable 
History, 65 MD. L. REV. 171, 179-80 (2006). 
292.  Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the 
Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Pager, supra note 31, at 397.  See Amanda 
Carlin, Comment, The Courtroom as White Space: Racial Performance as 
Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. REV. 450, 468 (2016). 
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viduals with disabilities,294 traumatized victims,295 medicated 
defendants,296 persons with religious objections to baring their 
face in public,297 and many others are at risk in a variety of 
ways; they share a tragic susceptibility to misreading of their 
credibility, particularly since an individual may have multiple 
risk factors. Ongoing controversies and numerous studies sug-
gest awareness of the problem, which intersects with the prob-
lem of implicit bias—although here mistaken beliefs can be ex-
 
293.  Katherine E. Melloy, Note, Telling Truths: How the Real ID Act’s 
Credibility Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 
658 (2007).  The author points out the numerous ways in which such women 
are at risk.  Id. at 653-61.  Male asylum seekers face similar risks, particular-
ly if they are members of sexual minorities.  Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Ter-
rorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real ID Act is a False Promise, 43 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 101, 129-33 (2006).  See also Melanie A. Conroy, Real Bias: How 
Real ID’s Credibility and Corroboration Requirements Impair Sexual Minori-
ty Asylum Applicants, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 34 (2009); James 
P. Eyster, Searching for the Key in the Wrong Place: Why “Common Sense” 
Credibility Rules Consistently Harm Refugees, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2012); Mi-
chael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility As-
sessment in Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367 (2003). 
294.  Christine N. Cea, Note, Autism and the Criminal Defendant, 88 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 495, 519 (2014). 
295.  For battered women, rape victims (rape trauma syndrome and de-
meanor), and abused children (child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome), 
see annotations in 85 A.L.R.5th 595 (2005).  See e.g., State v. Dudley, 856 
N.W.2d 668 (Iowa 2014). Even people judged “unattractive” are at risk. 
AMINA MEMON ET AL. PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY AND 
CREDIBILITY 39-42 (2d ed. 2003). 
296.  See Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the 
Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573 (2008).  
297.  The Michigan Rules of Evidence, apparently amended to allow 
judges to order women to remove their veils in court, require judges to “exer-
cise reasonable control over the appearance of parties and witnesses so as to 
(1) ensure that the demeanor of such persons may be observed and assessed 
by the fact-finder.”  MICH. R. EVID. 611(b).  See Brian M. Murray, Confronting 
Religion: Veiled Muslim Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2010); Steven R. Houchin, Confronting the Shadow: 
Is Forcing A Muslim Witness to Unveil in A Criminal Trial A Constitutional 
Right, or an Unreasonable Intrusion?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 823 (2009); Aaron J. 
Williams, The Veiled Truth: Can the Credibility of Testimony Given by A 
Niqab-Wearing Witness Be Judged Without the Assistance of Facial Expres-
sions?, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 273, 273-74 (2008). 
68https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/1
 2017 EYING THE BODY TO FIND TRUTH 447 
plicitly invoked.  Solutions including demeanor experts298 and 
judicial instructions have been proposed or attempted.299  Yet 
they are unlikely to work.  Use of demeanor experts risks only 
relocating decision making on the basis of delivery to a battle of 
experts.  Jury instructions or education before the trial are un-
likely to be successful300 and may even exacerbate the prob-
lem.301  Positioning the solution in the hands of judges ignores 
 
298.  Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testi-
mony?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1004-05 (2007); Michael W. Mullane, The Truth-
sayer and the Court: Expert Testimony on Credibility, 43 ME. L. REV. 53, 64 
(1991). 
299.  Levenson, supra note 296, at 573 (proposing jury instructions); 
Bennett, supra note 2, at 1371. 
300.  “Studies have shown jury instructions to be broadly ineffective 
across a wide variety of contexts.”  Pager, supra note 31, at 425.  This is gen-
erally true of attempts to remove cognitive bias and biasing information.  
MacLean & Dror, supra note 4, at 19-21.  Data suggest that a reason “jury 
instructions seem to be poorly understood . . . [is] ‘common sense justice.’” 
James R. P Ofloff & V. Gordon Rose, The Comprehension of Judicial Instruc-
tions in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 407, 246 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams 
eds., 2005). Common sense justice certainly includes demeanor and implicit, 
or explicit, bias.   
301.  As Amy L. Wax comments: 
 
[i]t is also virtually impossible to identify and correct bias 
from the ‘inside’’ that is, through introspective processes. 
Decision makers are generally unaware of the magnitude 
and direction of their own automatic biases. Even if they 
could willfully activate mechanisms to control and correct 
for presumed biases, they would have difficulty calibrating 
the corrective measures because they cannot gauge the pre-
cise extent to which particular biases are distorting their 
mental processes. 
Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1160 (1999) (cita-
tions omitted).  Diversity training aimed at unconscious biases in the work-
place has not been shown to work.  See Alexandra Kalevet al., Best Practices 
or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and 
Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589-617 (2006).  See also David Millier, 
Can Bias Training Really Improve Diversity in Tech?, U.S. NEWS (July 29, 
2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/29/can-bias-training-
really-improve-diversity-in-tech.  Nevertheless, the jury is still out on positive 
impacts of training on implicit bias.  See Bennett, supra note 2, at 169-70.  
Judge Bennett advocates as well for the elimination of peremptory challenges 
to avoid the impact of implicit or cognitive bias.  Id. at 168. 
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their participation in the traditional paradigm.302 
Screening or blinding decision makers so they cannot see 
any participants, including attorneys, while allowing them to 
hear and to see other evidence, is a potentially more effective 
solution.  This extends suggestions made by Blumenthal, who 
proposes screening the defendant “from the witness . . . and the 
witness from the jury, who can then focus on her voice in as-
sessing credibility.”303  Pager has also proposed screening wit-
nesses, possibly including the defendant, from the jury.304  As 
Pager points out, screening has the advantage of retaining 
much of what is perhaps most reliable – voice and presentation 
of content.305  No right inheres in the jury or judge that re-
quires visual presence.  Indeed, blind jurors are allowed on the 
grounds that excluding them would be discriminatory given 
their other ways to assess testimony.306  Further, legal rules, 
including evidentiary rules, already deny jurors other types of 
information that might be “unduly biasing.”307  Screening 
 
302.  For judges’ susceptibility to emotion, including reactions to partici-
pants in trials, see Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges 
Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 871-72 (2015). 
303.  Blumenthal, supra note 32, at 1202.  
304.  Pager, supra note 31, at 429-33.  Similarly, Spottswood proposes 
that live testimony be preferred at the beginning of litigation, followed by a 
switch to paper-based trials as more accurate.  Spottswood, supra note 32, at 
879, 881.  See Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsider-
ing Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 1248-49 (2010) (advocating that 
appellate review is the “functional equivalent of Dr. Pager’s screen” and, 
thus, more reliable). 
305.  Content is a much better indication of truth than physical demean-
or.  Pager, supra note 31, at 386. 
306.  “[B]lind individuals, like sighted jurors, weigh the content of the 
testimony given and examine speech patterns, intonation, and syntax in as-
sessing credibility.”  Galloway v. Superior Court of  D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12, 16 
(D.D.C. 1993).  See generally Nancy Lawler Dickhute, Jury Duty for the Blind 
in the Time of Reasonable Accommodations: The ADA’s Interface with A Liti-
gant’s Right to A Fair Trial, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849 (1999).  See also Adam 
Schwartzbaum, The Niqab in the Courtroom: Protecting Free Exercise of Reli-
gion in A Post-Smith World, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1533, 1568 (2011).  He 
grounds his argument on the inaccuracy of cultural markers of deception.  Id.  
at 1571. 
307.  Shari Seidman Diamond, The Cases for and Against Blindfolding 
the Jury, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS, supra note 4, at 267.  Diamond 
notes that evidentiary and other content restricting “rules forbidding juries 
access to available information have often been imposed to improve jury deci-
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builds on this standard approach.  It is beyond the scope of this 
article to assess the mechanics of screening in civil trials and 
the interaction of screening and the Confrontation Clause in 
criminal trials.308  However, it is worth noting that screening 
the decision maker still allows for witness-defendant confronta-
tion and cross-examination.309 
Screening decision makers also leaves intact the role of ju-
ry or judge in credibility determinations, simply removing “in-
formation” that has no value and may mislead.  The im-
portance and efficacy of blind judgment in an arena in which 
the content of information is aural has been much discussed in 
the contexts of blind orchestra auditions.310  Of course, as with 
auditions, blinding cannot remove all misleading markers of 
credibility that also could drive bias; gender, names, and other 
markers would remain.311  Because many moments before court 
 
sion making[,]. . . [but]are based on untested assumptions about how jurors 
make decisions.”  Id. at 275.  
308.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
309.  Blumenthal and Pager point out that screening can harmonize 
with the Confrontation Clause by allowing for cross examination and confron-
tation between defendant and accusers.  Blumenthal, supra note 32, at 1175; 
Pager, supra note 31, at 415-19. 
310.  For similar ideas in employment contexts, including argument 
from blind orchestral auditions, usually following Claudia Goldin & Cecilia 
Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Fe-
male Musicians, 90(4) AM. ECON. REV. 715-41 (2000), see Jerry Kang & Mah-
zarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative 
Action”, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006).  See also Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy 
Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
587, 611 (2000); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-
Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 n.20 (1991); Facial Discrimination: Extending 
Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Ap-
pearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2052 (1987).  For blinding in the docu-
ments about federal death penalty authorization, see G. Ben Cohen & Robert 
J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. 
REV. 425, 488-89 (2010). 
311.  For names promoting bias, see generally, Marianne Bertrand & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha 
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 991 (2004); Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of Gender on the 
Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A 
National Empirical Study, 41 SEX ROLES 509 (1999).  However, “race is not 
predicated on sight alone; the construction of race’s import crosses many sen-
sory and political modalities.”  Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Why Eyes? 
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processes also rely on demeanor credibility determinations, the 
remedy is perhaps too limited.  Blinding might even lead to a 
misguided sense of optimism about the act of decision and the 
possibilities of impartiality.312  Nevertheless, given the pro-
found risks imposed by the current system, screening decision 
makers would be a good first step. 
Blindfolded Justice—long a symbol of impartiality —has a 
deep historical resonance that harmonizes with contemporary 
screening.313  As Resnik and Curtis have shown, the iconogra-
phy of blind justice began its successful replacement of clear 
sighted justice at a historical era characterized by new doubts 
about decision making and decision makers.314  The blindfold 
symbolized aspirations to eliminate improper influences, be 
they class or kin allegiances, bribes, or bias.315  Similarly, the 
role of the jury evolved during a crisis of legitimacy when trial 
by ordeal and oath were deprived of their religious founda-
tions.316  Today, doubts stemming from new understanding of 
implicit or unconscious bias and other influences on decision-
making processes, coupled with fear of distorting personal and 
institutional allegiances and structures, are pervasive.317  To 
 
Cautionary Tales from Law’s Blindfolded Justice, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION 
TO BIAS, supra note 4, at 243. 
312.  Resnik & Curtis, supra note 311, at 243. 
313.  Pager notes the desirability of blind justice and links it to Rawls’ 
“veil of ignorance.”  Pager, supra note 31, at 428. 
314.  Resnik & Curtis, supra note 47, at 203-04, 212.  
315.  Id. at 218, 222-24, 227-29; Resnik & Curtis, supra note 311, at 237-
38. 
316.  Fisher, supra note 9, at 587-602.  
317.  See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implic-
it Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the 
Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
149, 169-70 (2010).  See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Super-
struct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563 
(2013); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of 
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006).  See also 
Christopher T. Robertson, Why Blinding? How Blinding? A Theory of Blind-
ing and Its Application to Institutional Corruption, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION 
TO BIAS, supra note 4, at 35 (arguing for blinding expert witnesses with a 
framework of personal advantage applicable more widely).  Anna Roberts 
notes “under the current regime, implicit bias is allowed to ‘flourish’ within 
jurors, attorneys, and judges, . . . The protections in place, conceived in an 
earlier era, fail to address the implicit biases that are now known to exist, 
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retain legitimacy, legal decision-making must evolve again. 
While blinding decision makers may seem an extreme 
remedy, it is, of course, one already embraced by medical re-
searchers, who must also make difficult decisions in the face of 
imperfect knowledge, including imperfect knowledge of them-
selves and the impact of even their most carefully considered 
actions.318  Further, blind decision making has liberating and 
suggestive power.  A powerful critique of blind justice is that it 
legitimizes unwillingness to see, thus concealing, even from 
ourselves, violence and inequity.319  Yet no matter where the 
parameters are drawn, at times decision is required.  At those 
moments, a screen can protect individuals from suffering from 
errors based their social, cultural, and physical selves.  Fur-
ther, a blindfold channels inward attention, as well as outward.  
It foregrounds inevitable individual and institutional fallibility, 
yet, however imperfectly, aspires to something more.  For the 
decision maker, the physical blindfold is a corrective to flawed 
assumptions already unseen inside herself. 
  
 
and in fact may intensify them.”  Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detec-
tion and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 841 (2012).  
She also proposes the Implicit Association Test to educate jurors.  Id. at 857-
58. 
318.  Medical science’s commitment to blinding extends even to review-
ers of results of blinded medical trials: “Blind assessments produced signifi-
cantly lower and more consistent scores than open assessments.”  Alejandro 
R. Jadad et al., Assessing the Quality of Reports of Randomized Clinical Tri-
als: Is Blinding Necessary?, 17 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 10 (1996). 
319.  I. Bennett Capers, Blind Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 179, 189 
(2012) (commenting that Justice is “not the only one indifferent to the horrors 
going on around her. She may be the only one who is literally blindfolded, but 
she’s not the only one who’s blind. They all are. So are we.”).  Resnik & Cur-
tis, supra note 47, at 233-35.  Criticisms of medical blind trials echo criti-
cisms of blind justice: they “produce protocols based on an idealized ‘average’ 
person that do not take into account the unique characteristics of individu-
als.”  Caryn Devins et al., Against Design, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 609, 675 (2011) 
(citing Stuart Kauffman et al., Transforming Medicine: A Manifesto, SCI. AM. 
WORLDVIEW 2014, at 28-29, 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/wv/assets/2014_SAWorldView.pdf.). 
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Appendix A: Scratching, the Body, Lies, and Human 
Dignity 
 
From the beginning of the conflict between elite rule and 
rhetoric and popular democracy and sophistic rhetoric, scratch-
ing figures as a debased “good” that competes with truth and 
emerges from the satisfaction of need that ties men to animals 
as a physical beings.  When Socrates, in Aristophanes’ comedy, 
asks an ordinary Athenian to get under some blankets and 
think, the man (hidden from view) reveals what unrestrained 
nature prioritizes:  first he scratches and complains of fleas, 
then he masturbates.320  A similar sequence animates the Pla-
tonic Socrates’ knock-out blow to sophists and their students as 
indulging in a debased popular knack of persuasion based on 
self-interest, rather than the elite art of truth telling.  The se-
quence, beginning with the power of persuasion in the assem-
bly among the mass of citizens, ends by asking whether “a man 
who has an itch and wants to scratch, and may scratch in all 
freedom, can pass his life happily in continual scratching.”  The 
“necessary” answer, “yes,” allows Socrates a quick pivot to sex 
and utterly discredits popular, sophistic rhetoric and any dem-
ocratic decisions it promotes by linking both to satisfaction of 
private, bodily desire.321 
For the elite tradition, the irresistible scratch quieting the 
distracting itch marks the intrusion of the physical self.  
Speech and truth hang in the balance as the speaker chooses 
between mind and body.  Choosing to scratch or simply scratch-
ing instinctively each reveal something deeply wrong.  Those 
who chose to scratch use reason to satisfy need that is disrepu-
table at best, lethal at worst.  Cicero was disastrously short-
sighted: he should have realized the moment he saw Caesar 
 
320.  ARISTOPHANES, CLOUDS.  See also DAPHNE O’REGAN, RHETORIC, 
COMEDY, AND THE VIOLENCE OF LANGUAGE IN ARISTOPHANES’ CLOUDS (1992). 
321.  PLATO, GORGIAS 494c, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., W.D. Woodhead trans., 1973).  
The same elite contempt is apparent in in the comment dismissing a crimi-
nal’s petition that envisioned judges deciding “how many times a prisoner 
should brush his teeth, go to the bathroom, wipe his nose, comb his hair, or 
scratch?”  Taylor v. Strickland, 411 F. Supp. 1390, 1395 n.13 (D.S.C. 1976). 
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scratching his head with one finger that he might overthrow 
the Roman Republic.322  Those who simply scratch because they 
must reveal that body rules mind. Either way leads directly to 
irrational passions and to lies. 
Given the dominance of the elite tradition, it is not surpris-
ing that scratching, and nose scratching in particular, have be-
come the iconic – if inaccurate – gestures that mark the liar in 
legal and popular culture.  Ordinary commonsense is invoked 
as enough to know that judge and jury can detect lies when 
“[t]he speaker may slightly rub or scratch the nose, usually 
with the index finger (A big cue for deception).”323  Although 
repeatedly debunked, the cultural tenacity of this meme is 
demonstrated in the first episode of TV drama Lie to Me.  Paul 
Ekman, the expert on leakage and micro expressions whose 
work inspired the show, told the New York Times that the pro-
ducers insisted on using rubbing, otherwise known as scratch-
ing, the nose as proof of lying – contrary to Ekman’s advice.324  
Its presence testified to the writers’ participation in our rhetor-
ical/social tradition and their conviction that the audience 
would understand and believe this trope.325 
Yet the power of scratching, particularly the nose, to con-
vey an irreducible human nature prompts an alternative use: 
to sum up the whole range of basic human needs and to func-
 
322.  PLUTARCH, LIFE OF JULIUS CAESAR 443 (Loeb Classical Library) 
(E.H. Warmington ed., Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1967).   
323.  84 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, supra note 93, § 28.  Advice to attorneys em-
phasizes “[n]ever scratch an itch, no matter where it is. If your nose itches, 
stop speaking completely, take out a cloth handkerchief, turn to the side, and 
say, ‘Excuse me.’ Then wipe your nose neatly, thereby ‘scratching’ it. 
Acknowledge jurors with a look and resume speaking.”  Id. § 29.  “It became 
important that the students were aware of their ‘stage presence’ and did not, 
as we observed, pick their noses, scratch their behinds, or stand on one foot 
and let the other shoe dangle or fall.”  Robert E. Jagger, Stetson: The First 
Public Defender Clinic, 30 STETSON L. REV. 189, 206 (2000). 
324.  Bill Carter, He’s Inspired the Latest Crime Series by Decoding the 
Traits of Liars, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/arts/television/21carter.html.  
325.  Mark Twain in The Prince and Pauper uses this trope to mock the 
falseness of elite rules when the pauper, Tom, after a dinner during which he 
realizes that to do anything with his hands is unbecoming, ultimately, to his 
shame, cannot resist scratching his nose as ‘nature broke down the barriers 
of etiquette.”  MARK TWAIN, THE PRINCE AND THE PAUPER 342 (1920).  
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tion as a marker for a realm of personal autonomy and truth 
quite different from the elite image.  It defines a realm outside 
the state and its law.326  Thus, state overreaching is paradoxi-
cally conveyed as restriction that prevents scratching.  Human 
dignity and autonomy are violated when “freedom was restrict-




326.  “All the actions one might take with what is rightfully his or hers 
can never be specified or reduced to a list. It includes the right to . . .  scratch 
one’s nose when it itches (and even when it doesn’t) . . . . The problem, there-
fore, with any explicit protection of these liberties is that the liberty of the 
people can never be completely enumerated or listed.”  Randy E. Barnett, The 
Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 448 (2004).  See 
also Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 32 
(1990). 
327.  Litigants know this trope as well: “‘with them chains you can’t 
walk, you can’t scratch your nose or nothing, it’s very limited access’ (A: 434), 
‘and most of all it was inappropriate . . . why not let them violate all of your 
rights.’”  Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 4, Murray v. M. McGinnus, 2003 
WL 22513720 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 2003) (No. 01-2632).  See also Maria Bucci, 
Young, Alone, and Fleeing Terror: The Human Rights Emergency of Unac-
companied Immigrant Children Seeking Asylum in the United States, 30 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 275, 302 (2004).  Deprivation of rights 
is summarized by being required to ask permission to scratch one’s nose.  See 
Heather Habes, Paying for the Graying: How California Can More Effectively 
Manage its Growing Elderly Inmate Population, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
395, 402 (2011); Christine M. Gordon, Are Unaccompanied Alien Children 
Really Getting A Fair Trial? An Overview of Asylum Law and Children, 33 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 641, 658-59 (2005). 
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